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INTRODUCTION
The general rule, under both negligence principles and strict
products liability, is that a producer or supplier is required to warn users
or consumers of its products.' In most cases, this duty can be satisfied
by placing a warning label on the product itself or by providing safety
information in an owner's manual or in other literature attached to or
enclosed with the product. However, there are some situations where
it is difficult or impracticable to provide a direct warning to the ultimate
user or consumer. In such cases, producers and suppliers should be able
1. See Christopher P. Downs, Comment, Duty to Warn and the Sophisticated User
Defense in Products Liability Cases, 15 U. BALT. L. REV. 276, 280 (1986).
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to satisfy their duty to warn by providing safety information to
intermediaries who may be expected to pass this information along to
the ultimate users or consumers of the product.
The drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Torts ("Restatement")
have acknowledged the legitimacy of warning through intermediaries in
section 388.2 This, in turn, has given rise to a number of specialized
doctrines, such as the learned intermediary rule and the sophisticated
user doctrine, which permit product producers and suppliers to warn
through intermediaries in certain situations. The learned intermediary
doctrine, though often criticized by legal commentators, seems to work
well in the relatively narrow domain of pharmaceutical products.3 The
sophisticated user doctrine, and related concepts commonly applied to
suppliers of component parts and bulk products, is less satisfactory.
Some courts employ a duty-oriented approach, which allows producers
and suppliers to rely on intermediaries to convey warnings to product
end users.4 Other courts utilize a balancing approach, but this provides
little guidance to producers and suppliers about when reliance on
intermediaries is appropriate and when it is not.5
This article proposes a "general rule" to cover most situations
where warning through intermediaries is feasible.6 This proposed rule
would allow producers and suppliers to rely on intermediaries in
virtually all cases to transmit warnings to users and consumers of
products. Part I provides a brief overview of the duty to warn under
negligence and strict products liability. Part II examines the caselaw on
warning through intermediaries, focusing on pharmaceutical products,
products designed for industrial use, component parts and bulk products.
Part III discusses the feasibility of a general rule on warning through
intermediaries and evaluates the advantages and disadvantages of a
duty-oriented approach and a balancing approach. Finally, part IV
introduces a specific proposal based on a duty-oriented approach.
I. THE DUTY TO WARN
Manufacturers7 and others in the distributive chain' have a duty
2. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 cmt. n (1965).
3. See infra part II.A.
4. See infra part II.B.1.a.
5. See infra part II.B.l.a.
6. See infra part IV.
7. See Dix W. Noel, Products Defective Because of Inadequate Directions or
Warnings, 23 Sw. L.J. 256, 281 (1969) ("The duty to warn runs to those the manufacturer
118719961
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to provide adequate warnings about product-related risks to foreseeable
users and consumers of their products. 9 This duty exists under both
negligence and strict liability principles." Section 388 of the Restate-
ment sets forth the duty to warn under a negligence standard. This
provision declares that the supplier of a product may be held liable to
foreseeable users or consumers of the product if: (1) the supplier
knows, or should know, that the product could be dangerous under
normal or foreseeable use; (2) the supplier realizes that prospective
users or consumers may not be aware of the product's dangerous
condition; and (3) the supplier fails to exercise reasonable care to
inform users or consumers about product-related risks."
Product sellers may also be held liable for failure to warn under the
doctrine of strict products liability.' 2 According to section 402A of the
Restatement, commercial sellers will be held liable, regardless of fault,
to consumers for any personal injuries caused by products that are
should expect to use the chattel, or be endangered by its probable use, and the warning must
be reasonably calculated to reach such persons, directly or indirectly.").
8. See M. Stuart Madden, The Duty to Warn in Products Liability: Contours and
Criticism, 89 W. VA. L. REV. 221, 279 (1987) ("Liability for failure to provide adequate
warnings may be imposed upon all entities within the chain of distribution, including not
only manufacturers, but suppliers, wholesalers, distributors and retailers as well.").
9. Product sellers also may be held liable for failing to provide proper directions or
instructions. See, e.g., Edwards v. California Chem. Co., 245 So. 2d 259,260-65 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1971) (instructions on insecticide found to be inadequate because they did not
advise customers to wear respirator and protective clothing while using product); Tompkins
v. Log Systems, Inc., 385 S.E.2d 545, 547 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989) (reasonable person could
conclude that instructions included in pre-packaged kits for construction of log homes were
inadequate because they failed to explain how to make sure that building walls were plumb).
In theory, warnings and instructions serve different purposes: warnings provide users
or consumers with information about product-related risks, while instructions demonstrate
how to use the product properly and safely. See Jerry J. Phillips, A Synopsis of the
Developing Law of Products Liability, 28 DRAKE L. REV. 317, 350 (1978-79); Victor E.
Schwartz & Russell W. Driver, Warnings in the Workplace: The Need for a Synthesis of
Law and Communication Theory, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 38, 51-52 (1983). Nevertheless,
courts and commentators often use the term "warning" to include both warnings and
instructions.
10. See Douglas R. Richmond, Renewed Look at the Duty to Warn and Affirmative
Defenses, 61 DEF. CouNs. J. 205, 205 (1994). Failure to warn may also subject a
manufacturer to liability for breach of implied warranty. See Madden, supra note 8, at 250;
Candada J. Moore, Comment, Duty to Warn Within the Implied Warranty of Merchantabili-
ty, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 747, 754 (1980).
11. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965). Each of these conditions
must be met in order for there to be liability. Douglas R. Richmond, When Plain English
Isn't: Manufacturers' Duty to Warn in a Second Language, 29 TORT & INS. L.J. 588, 589
(1994).
12. See Rex K. Linder, Update on Duty to Warn, 55 DEF. CouNs. J. 422, 424 (1988).
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defective and unreasonably dangerous. 3 A product that is otherwise
properly made, will be regarded as defective and unreasonably
dangerous if the manufacturer fails to provide adequate warning in
appropriate circumstances. 4
Many courts'" and commentators 6 have concluded that the duty
to warn is essentially the same under either negligence or strict liability
theories. However, this view is by no means universally accepted.17
13. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
14. See id. § 402A, cmt j. See also Koonce v. Quaker Safety Prods. & Mfg. Co., 798
F.2d 700, 716 (5th Cir. 1986) ("The absence of adequate warnings or directions may render
a product defective and unreasonably dangerous, even if the product has no manufacturing
or design defects."); Pavlides v. Galveston Yacht Basin, Inc., 727 F.2d 330, 338 (5th Cir.
1984) ("The lack of adequate warnings renders a product defective and unreasonably
dangerous even though there is no manufacturing or design defect in the product."); Jackson
v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809, 811 (9th Cir. 1974) ("A product may be
perfectly manufactured and meet every requirement for its designed utility and still be
rendered unreasonably dangerous through failure to warn of its dangerous characteristics.");
Lee v. Butcher Boy, 215 Cal. Rptr. 195, 201 (Ct. App. 1985) ("Even if the product is
faultlessly made, it may be found defective if unreasonably dangerous when placed in the
hands of a user without adequate warning.").
15. See, e.g., DiPalma v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 938 F.2d 1463, 1466 (1st Cir.
1991) ("[T]he duty to warn, the violation of which is actionable by means of the so-called
strict liability cause of action, is measured ... by the same standard as the duty to warn that
is enforceable in a regligence cause of action."); Smith v. Walter C. Best, Inc. 927 F.2d
736, 741 (3d Cir. 1990) ("[The standard imposed upon the defendant meeting a claim of
strict liability based upon a failure to warn is the same as that imposed upon the defendant
faced with a claim of negligent failure to warn."); Pottle v. Up-Right, Inc., 628 A.2d 672,
675 (Me. 1993) ("Regardless of whether a 'failure to warn is phrased in terms of negligence
[or] strict liability, the analysis ... is basically the same."'); Germann v. F.L. Smithe Mach.
Co., 381 N.W.2d 503, 508 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) ("[I]n failure to warn cases, there is
essentially no distinction between negligence and strict liability.").
16. See M. STLART MADDEN, I PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 10.3 (2d ed. 1988) ("[I]n the
context of failure to warn jurisprudence, the functional characteristics of strict liability and
negligence theories are almost indistinguishable."); Robert D. Cooter, Defective Warnings,
Remote Causes, ana Bankruptcy: Comment on Schwartz, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 737, 740
(1985) ("The two verbal formulations are materially equivalent because the scope of
responsibility and the extent of liability are the same."); Madden, supra note 8, at 225. ("In
the context of definir g the suppliers' duty to warn, however, the jurisprudence of negligence
and strict liability to have converged."); Richmond, supra note 11, at 591. ("In the warnings
context negligence and strict liability have converged.").
17. See Mark M. Hager, Don't Say I Didn't Warn You (Even Though I Didn't): Why
the Pro-Defendant Consensus on Warning Law Is Wrong, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1125, 1130-34
(1994) (criticizing the view that strict liability and negligence theories are the same in
failure to warn cases); Patricia R. v. Sullivan, 631 P.2d 91, 102 (Alaska 1981) ("We are in
accord with those authorities which hold that in strict liability cases the need for and the
sufficiency of a warning should be expressed without reference to negligence principles.");
Little v. PPG Indus., Inc., 594 P.2d 911, 914 (Wash. 1979) ("It is the adequacy of the
warning which is given, or the necessity of such a warning, which must command the jury's
11891996]
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Some courts, for example, impute knowledge of product-related risks to
manufacturers under strict liability, but not under negligence, particular-
ly in asbestos cases.'8  However, most courts reject this "hindsight"
approach and merely require manufacturers to warn of risks that are
"scientifically knowable" at the time the product is marketed. 9
In general, there is no duty to warn, under either negligence or
strict products liability, about product-related hazards that are known to
the general public.2" Manufacturers have invoked this "obvious
hazard" principle to defeat claims arising from the use of such diverse
products as lawn mowers,2' above-ground swimming pools,2 2 alcohol-
attention, not the defendant's conduct.").
18. See In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases, 960 F.2d 806, 816 (9th Cir. 1992)
("[E]vidence as to the possible extent of defendant's knowledge concerning the dangerous-
ness of its own products is not admissible in ... failure-to-warn cases."); Kisor v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 783 F.2d 1337, 1341 (9th Cir. 1986) ("Owens Illinois's [sic] inquiries about
medical knowledge in the industry ... impermissibly put negligence concepts before the
jury."); Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 737 F.2d 462, 465 (5th Cir. 1984) ("[Iln
a strict products liability case, the manufacturer is presumed to know the defects of its
product."); Johnson v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 740 P.2d 548, 549 (Haw. 1987) ("[lI]n a
strict products liability action, the issue of whether the seller knew or reasonably should
have known of the dangers inherent in his or her product is irrelevant to the issue of
liability."); Hayes v. Ariens Co., 462 N.E.2d 273, 277 (Mass. 1984) ("mhe adequacy of
a warning is measured by the warning that would have been given at the time of sale by
an ordinarily prudent vendor who at that time, is fully aware of the risks presented by the
product."); Beshfda v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 547 (N.J. 1982) ("It is
precisely the imputation of knowledge to the defendant that distinguishes strict liability from
negligence.").
19. See Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 557 (Cal. 1991)
("[We hereby adopt the requirement ... that knowledge or knowability is a component of
strict liability for failure to warn."); Fibreboard Corp. v. Fenton, 845 P.2d 1168, 1172 (Colo.
1993) ("We agree with petitioners that state-of-the-art evidence is properly admissible to
establish that a product is not defective and unreasonably dangerous because of a failure-to-
warn.").
20. See Plante v. Hobart Corp., 771 F.2d 617, 620 (1st Cir. 1985) ("Where the danger
involved in using a product is obvious and apparent, discernible by casual inspection, a
supplier is not negligent in failing to warn of that danger."). The standard is an objective
one, based on what would be obvious to the ordinary person. See Fleck v. KDI Sylvan
Pools, Inc., 981 F.2d 107, 119 (3d Cir. 1992) ("[W]hether a danger is open and obvious is
an objective inquiry, not dependent upon the actual knowledge of the user or his actual
awareness of the danger."); Glittenberg v. Doughboy, 491 N.W.2d 208, 213 (Mich. 1992)
("Determination of the 'obvious' character of a product-connected danger is objective.").
21. See Kuras v. International Harvester Co., 820 F.2d 15, 18 (1st Cir. 1987) (danger
of injury from moving blades of lawn mower was open and obvious to user).
22. See Lamb v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., I F.3d 1184, 1189-90 (11th Cir. 1993)
(manufacturer of above-ground swimming pool has no duty to warn that small children
might drown); Glittenberg v. Doughboy, 491 N.W.2d 208, 218-19 (Mich. 1992) (danger of
diving head first into shallow above-ground swimming pool was obvious to ordinary user
so manufacturer did not have a duty to warn).
1190
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ic beverages, 23 motor vehicles, 24 childrens' toys, 25 and other famil-
iar, but potentially dangerous, products.26 It should be noted, however,
that a growing number of courts have rejected the obvious danger rule
as an absolute limitation on the duty to warn.27 According to these
courts, obviousness of risk is treated as only one factor to be considered
in determining whether or not a warning should be given.28
23. See Pemberton v. American Distilled Spirits Co., 664 S.W.2d 690, 693 (Tenn.
1984) (no duty to warn teenager about the health risks of drinking large quantity of
undiluted grain alcohol at one time); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. McGuire, 814
S.W.2d 385, 388 (Tex. 1991) (manufacturer of alcoholic beverages had no duty to warn
consumers about the consequences of prolonged and excessive drinking).
24. See Westchem Agric. Chems., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 990 F.2d 426, 431-32(8th
Cir. 1993) (manufacturer of pickup truck owes no duty to warn consumer that improperly
splicing into vehicle's electrical wiring system could cause fire); Shaffer v. AMF, 842 F.2d
893, 897-98 (6th Cir. 1988) (because danger of riding motorcycle was open and obvious,
manufacturer did not have to warn user of risk of serious injuries in the event of a collision
with a larger vehicle).
25. See Borjorqaez v. House of Toys, Inc., 133 Cal. Rptr. 483, 484 (Dist. Ct. App.
1976) ("Ever since David slew Goliath young and old alike have known that slingshots can
be dangerous and deadly."); Bookout v. Victor Comptometer Corp., 576 P.2d 197 (Colo.
App. 1978) (potential for danger inherent in BB gun is readily apparent and no warning is
required); Atkins v. Asians Dep't Store of Norman, Inc., 522 P.2d 1020, 1022 (Okla. 1974)
(manufacturer is not required to warn against danger of throwing pointed darts in the
direction of another person).
26. See, e.g., Bilski v. Scientific Atlanta, 964 F.2d 697, 700 (7th Cir. 1992) (maker
of satellite dish had no duty to warn user about danger of climbing up on dish to remove
snow from it); Argutright v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 868 F.2d 764, 766-67 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 934 (1989) (danger of unlocked pilot seat during takeoff was sufficiently
obvious that airplane manufacturer, who had included seat lock inspection in preflight
checklist, was not required to provide a specific warning against this risk); McPhail v.
Municipality of Culebra, 598 F.2d 603, 607 (1st Cir. 1979) (danger involved in sailing boat
with an aluminum mast into power line was patent and obvious); Lorfano v. Dura Stone
Steps, Inc., 569 A.2d 195, 197 (Me. 1990) (dangers posed by use of steps without a handrail
held to be patently obvious and apparent to all); Morrison v. Grand Forks Hous. Auth., 436
N.W.2d 221, 228-29 (N.D. 1989) (manufacturer of battery-powered smoke detector not
required to warn users that product would not operate if batteries were removed).
27. See Banks v. Iron Hustler Corp., 475 A.2d 1243, 1252 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984)
("lit is clear that the 'obviousness' of the danger is but one element in the equation.");
Olson v. A.W. Chesterson Co., 256 N.W.2d 530, 537 (N.D. 1977) ("There is no valid
reason for automatic preclusion of liability based solely upon 'obviousness' of danger in an
action [based on failLre to warn].").
28. See Horen v. Coleco Indus., Inc., 426 N.W.2d 794, 796 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988)
("Although such a determination [that the danger is obvious] may be utilized as one factor
among others to conclude that the manufacturer has no duty to warn because the product
is not unreasonably dangerous, the new test is whether the risks are unreasonable in light
of the foreseeable injuries."); Campos v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 485 A.2d 305, 309-
10 (N.J. 1984) ("[I]n our state the obviousness of a danger, as distinguished from a
plaintiff's subjective Knowledge of a danger, is merely one element to be factored into the
analysis to determine whether a duty to warn exists.").
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Once a court concludes that the manufacturer has a duty to warn,
it must then determine whether the warning actually given was
adequate.29 An adequate warning is one that is reasonable under the
circumstances. 30 This is usually regarded as a question of fact for the
jury to decide3' and involves a consideration of a number of factors:
First, the warning's factual content must be adequate. A warning must
provide information about all significant risks associated with the
product's use,32 and must reveal the actual likelihood and gravity of
such risks when they are known by the manufacturer.33 Second, the
physical format of the warning is also important, and a warning will be
considered inadequate if its print size is too small to be noticed by the
user,34 or if the warning is not placed in a prominent position on the
29. See Hardy C. Dillard & Harris Hart II, Product Liability: Directions for Use and
the Duty to Warn, 41 VA. L. REV. 145, 160 (1955).
30. See Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 657 (1st Cir. 1981) ("An
adequate warning is one reasonable under the circumstances."); Graham v. Wyeth Lab., 666
F. Supp. 1483, 1498 (D. Kan. 1987) ("An adequate warning is one that is reasonable under
the circumstances."); Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541, 553 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1979) ('To be adequate, a warning must be reasonable under the circumstances.").
31. See Gracyalny v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 723 F.2d 1311, 1316 (7th Cir. 1983)
("We hold that the adequacy of a particular warning is an issue of fact to be determined by
the jury."); Bryant v. Technical Research Co., 654 F.2d 1337, 1345 (9th Cir. 1981) ("The
adequacy of a warning under products liability is a question of fact to be left to the jury.");
Alm v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 717 S.W.2d 588, 592 (Tex. 1986) ("The adequacy of a
warning is a question of fact to be determined by the jury."). But see Werckenthein v.
Bucher Petrochemical Co., 618 N.E.2d 902, 909 (Ill. Ct. App. 1993) (holding as a matter
of law that a warning was adequate).
32. See Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 939 F.2d 1293, 1300 (5th Cir. 1991) ("Because the
principal purpose of the warning is to permit the user to make an informed decision whether
to expose himself to the risks of the product, however, a manufacturer or distributor 'fulfills
its duty to warn in this context only if it warns of all dangers associated with its products
of which it has actual or constructive knowledge."') (quoting Jackson v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314, 1320 (5th Cir. 1985)); Lindsay v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,
637 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1980) ("The manufacturer's duty is to warn of all potential dangers
which it knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, to exist."); Deines
v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 755 F. Supp. 350, 353 (D. Kan. 1990) ("The manufacturer's duty is
to warn of all potential dangers which it knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should
have known, to exist.").
33. See Martinkovic v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 669 F. Supp. 212, 216 (N.D. Ill. 1987)
(warning provided to prescribing physician of DTP vaccine could be considered inadequate
because it characterized risk of convulsions as "exceedingly rare," when some studies
showed the risk to be as high as one in 1,750).
34. See Gardner v. Q.H.S., Inc., 448 F.2d 238, 243 (4th Cir. 1971) (warning about
flammability of hair rollers held to be inadequate because it was in the same print size as
other material on the product's label); Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79, 86 (4th
Cir. 1962) (warning on furniture polish found to be inadequate because print was too small
to attract attention of users).
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label.3 5  Third, a warning must be phrased with a degree of intensity
that is commensurate with the danger36 and must not be ambiguous,
equivocal, or contradictory.37 Fourth, an effective warning must be
written in such a way that it can be easily understood by its intended
audience.38  A warning that uses technical language not easily
understood by members of the general public may not be adequate. 9
35. See D'Arienzo v. Clairol, Inc., 310 A.2d 106, 111 (N.J. Super. 1973) (jury issue
presented as to adequacy of warning which placed information about risk of allergic reaction
to hair dye at the end of instructions on how to apply patch test).
36. See Lars Noah, Constraints on the Off-Label Uses of Prescription Drug Products,
16 J. PROD. & Toxics LIAB. 139, 152 (1994); James B. Sales, The Duty to Warn and
Instruct for Safe Use in Strict Tort Liability, 13 ST. MARY'S L.J. 521, 551 (1982). See also
Salmon v. Parke, Davs & Co., 520 F.2d 1359, 1363 (4th Cir. 1975); Martinkovic v. Wyeth
Lab., Inc., 669 F. Supp. 212, 215 (N.D. I11. 1987); Seley v. G.D. Searle & Co., 423 N.E.2d
831, 837 (Ohio 1981); Mahr v. G.D. Searle & Co., 390 N.E.2d 1214, 1230 (I1l. App. Ct.
1979); Richards v. Upjohn Co., 625 P.2d 1192, 1196 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980).
37. See Givens v. Lederle, 556 F.2d 1341, 1345 (5th Cir. 1977) (oral polio vaccine
warning characterizing risk of paralysis as one in three million found to be potentially
inadequate because it also expressed doubt about whether there was any causal link at all
between vaccine and paralysis); Bean v. Ross Mfg. Co., 344 S.W.2d 18, 23-24 (Mo. 1961)
(describing drain solvent as "effervescent" not sufficient to warn user that violent explosion
might result when product came into contact with water in a confined space); Mahr, 390
N.E.2d at 1231 (oral contraceptive warning concluding that causal connection had been
established between birth control pills and strokes diluted the effect of warning).
An otherwise satisfactory warning may be diluted by qualifying language or
accompanying representations of safety that blunt the effects of the warning. See McFadden
v. Haritatos, 448 N.Y.S.2d 79, 81 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984); Givens, 556 F.2d at 1345
(expression of doubt about causal connection between oral polio vaccine and paralysis
difuted the effect of warning); Salmon, 520 F.2d at 1363 (expression of doubt about whether
chloramphenicol caused aplastic anemia diluted the effect of disclosure about the need to
take precautions against anemia); Maize v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 41 A.2d 850, 852 (Pa. 1945)
(the words "Safety-Kleen" prominently displayed on the product's label held to have diluted
the effect of the warning).
A warning may also be diluted by subsequent advertising and promotional activities
which downplay the product's risks. See Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 507 P.2d 653,,662
(Cal. 1973) (warning provided to physicians by drug company about the risk of aplastic
anemia from administration of Chloromycetin antibiotic to patients was nullified by
subsequent overpromotion); Incolligo v. Ewing, 282 A.2d 206, 220 (Pa. 1971) (warning
provided to physicians by drug company about the risk of aplastic anemia from administra-
tion of Chloromycetin antibiotic to patients was nullified by subsequent overpromotion).
38. Schwartz & Driver, supra note 9, at 61. See Bryant v. Technical Research Co.,
654 F.2d 1337, 1345-46 (9th Cir. 1981) ("An important factor in evaluating the adequacy
of a warning is the clarity of the warning.").
39. See MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65,71-72 (Mass. 1985)
(warning that oral contraceptive might cause "cerebral thrombosis" did not adequately
communicate the risk of a stroke to users). In addition, some courts have concluded that
warnings printed solely in English may not be sufficient. Those that failed to use
pictograms or Spanish when the expected users of the product were known to be incapable
of understanding an English warning were inadequate. See Hubbard-Hall Chem. Co. v.
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Finally, an otherwise acceptable warning may be found inadequate if it
has not been communicated through the most effective channels.'
II. RELIANCE ON INTERMEDIARIES: A DOCTRINAL OVERVIEW
As mentioned above, section 388, comment n, of the Restatement
describes in general terms the circumstances under which a product
supplier may rely on intermediaries to transmit safety information to
users or consumers. In addition to section 388, there are several
doctrines that permit product suppliers to warn through intermediaries
in certain situations. The first of these, the learned intermediary rule,
is applicable to sales of pharmaceutical products. The second doctrine,
the sophisticated user doctrine, applies primarily to commercial
transactions. Each of these doctrines will be examined in some detail
below.
Silverman, 340 F.2d 402, 405 (1st Cir. 1965) ("mhe jury could reasonably have believed
that defendant should have foreseen that its admittedly dangerous product would be used
by, among others, persons like plaintiffs intestates, who were farm laborers, of limited
education and reading ability, and that a warning ... would not, because of its lack of a
skull and bones or other comparable symbols or hieroglyphics, be 'adequate."'); Stanley
Indus., Inc. v. W.M. Barr & Co., 784 F. Supp. 1570, 1576 (S.D. Fla. 1992) ("In light of the
defendants' joint advertising in Miami's Hispanic media and the nature of the product, this
court likewise finds that it is for the jury to decide whether the defendant could have
foreseen that boiled linseed oil would be used by persons such as Gallery's Nicaraguan.
Spanish-Speaking unskilled laborers."); Campos v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 485 A.2d
305, 310 (N.J. 1984) ("In view of the unskilled or semi-skilled nature of the work and the
existence of many in the work force who do not read English, warnings in the form of
symbols might have been appropriate."); but see Ramirez v. Plough, Inc., 863 P.2d 167, 173
(Cal. 1993) ('To preserve ... uniformity and clarity, to avoid adverse impacts upon the
warning requirements mandated by the federal regulatory scheme, and in deference to the
superior technical and procedural lawmaking resources of legislative and administrative
bodies, we adopt the legislative/regulatory standard of care that mandates nonprescription
drug package warnings in English only."); Thomas v. Clairol, Inc., 583 So. 2d 108, 110-11
(La. Ct. App. 1991) ("[Pllaintiff... had the burden to show the use [of the defendant's hair
dye product] was sufficient [among illiterate consumers] that defendant should have foreseen
it and provided additional warnings or other safety precautions.").
40. See Yarrow v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 159 (D.S.D. 1967), aff'd, 408 F.2d
978 (8th Cir. 1969) (failure to use detail men to warn physicians about risk of vision loss
from the use of Aralen rendered warning ineffective); Richards, 625 P.2d at 1192 (holding
that a jury might conclude that changing contraindication for neomycin in package inserts
and PDR might not be sufficient to communicate newly discovered danger of using
antibiotic to irrigate open wounds when this use had been recommended for more than 10
years).
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A. The Learned Intermediary Rule
Ordinarily, the manufacturer of a prescription drug does not have
to inform a patient about drug-related dangers as long as it provides an
adequate warning to the patient's prescribing physician. 41 Warnings
to physicians may be conveyed by means of a package insert, by
advertisement in the Physician's Desk Reference, an advertisement in
medical journals, direct letters to physicians, or by personal visits to
physicians' offices by company representatives known as "detail
men." 42 The legal sufficiency of a particular method of communica-
tion will depend on the circumstances.43
This" limitation on the manufacturer's duty to warn is known as the
learned intermediary rule because the physician is expected to act as an
intermediary between the manufacturer and the patient.44 Accordingly,
once the manufacturer informs the physician about drug-related risks,
the burden shifts to the physician to disclose this information to the
41. See Thomas v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 949 F.2d 806, 811 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
504 U.S. 956 (1992) (failure to warn patient of product's risk does not render product
defective or unreasonably dangerous so long as manufacturer adequately warns learned
intermediary); Anderson v. McNeilab, Inc., 831 F.2d 92, 93 (5th Cir. 1987) (prescription
drug manufacturer discharges its duty to warn when it reasonably informs prescribing
physicians of the dangers of harm from the drug); Beyette v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,
823 F.2d 990, 992 (6th Cir. 1987) (manufacturer of pharmaceutical product has a duty to
warn the medical profession, not the patient, of any risks inherent in the use of a product
that the manufacturer knows or should know exists); Plummer v. Lederle Lab., Div. of Am.
Cyanamid Co., 819 F.2d 349, 356 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 898 (1987) (in the case
of prescription drug; dispensed by physicians, manufacturer's obligation is to warn the
physician); Swayze v. McNeil Labs., 807 F.2d 464,470 (5th Cir. 1987) (where prescription
drugs are concerned, a manufacturer's duty extends only to the physician and not to patient);
Tracy v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 569 N.E.2d 875, 878 (Ohio 1991) (where a
drug has been prescribed for a patient, manufacturer discharges its duty to warn if it
adequately warns the prescribing physician); but see Proctor v. Davis, 656 N.E.2d 23, 31
(I11. App. Ct. 1995) (holding that a drug manufacturer has no duty to warn if the risk is
generally known within the medical community).
42. See Donald E. Thompson II, Comment, The Drug Manufacturer's Duty to
Warn-To Whom Does It Extend?, 13 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 135, 144 (1985).
43. Compare Wyeth Labs., Inc. v. Fortenberry, 530 So. 2d 688, 692-93 (Miss. 1988)
(warning about routine risks communicated by means of package insert held to be adequate
as a matter of law) with Yarrow, 263 F. Supp. at 163 (holding that manufacturer should
have used detail men to communicate warning to physicians).
44. See Barbara M. McGarey, Comment, Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and
Consumer-Directed Information-Enhancing the Safety of Prescription Drug Use, 34 CATH.
U. L. REV. 117, 122-23 (1984).
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patient.' However, if the manufacturer fails to provide an effective
warning to the prescribing physician, the patient will have a direct cause
of action against the manufacturer for any injuries that occur as the
result of this breach of duty.46 Although severely criticized by some
legal commentators,47 the learned intermediary rule continues to be
recognized by the vast majority of courts."s
1. Prescription Drugs
The learned intermediary rule was formulated by a federal appeals
court almost thirty years ago in Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish.49 In
that case, the court offered the following rationale for requiring the
manufacturer to warn the prescribing physician rather than thd patient:
Moreover, in this case we are dealing with a prescription drug rather
than a normal consumer item. In such a case the purchaser's doctor
is a learned intermediary between the purchaser and the manufactur-
er. If the doctor is properly warned of the possibility of a side effect
in some patients, and is advised of the symptoms normally accompa-
45. See Brooks v. Medtronic, Inc., 750 F.2d 1227, 1232 (4th Cir. 1984) ("Once
adequate warnings are given to the physician, the choice of treatment and the duty to
disclose properly fall on the doctor."). This duty to warn patients about risks associated
with the use of a prescription drug is based on the doctrine of informed consent. See Alan
R. Styles, Note, Prescription Drugs and the Duty to Warn: An Argument for Patient
Package Inserts, 39 CLEV. ST. L. REV. I11, 121 (1991).
46. See Wooderson v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 681 P.2d 1038, 1050 (Kan. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 965 (1984) ("Although the duty of the ethical drug manufacturer is
to warn the doctor, rather than the patient, the manufacturer is directly liable to the patient
for a breach of such duty.") (quoting McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 528 P.2d 522,
529 (Or. 1974).
47. See Margaret Gilhooley, Learned Intermediaries, Prescription, Drugs and Patient
Information, 30 ST. Louis U. L.J. 633, 657-58 (1986) ("The change in the informed consent
doctrine makes appropriate a corresponding change in the role that the physician should
perform as a 'learned intermediary."'); Susan A. Casey, Comment, Laying an Old Doctrine
to Rest: Challenging the Wisdom of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine, 19 WM. MITCHELL
L. REv. 931, 958 (1993) ("mhe learned intermediary doctrine is based on medical
paternalism that is inconsistent with the concept of informed consent."); Thompson, supra
note 42, at 146 ("By placing the warning into the hands of the physician, who is given sole
discretion to determine what risk, if any, will be communicated to the patient, the current
system of manufacturer warnings perpetuates paternalism and aggravates the problem of
informed consent.").
48. See Barbara P. Flannagan, Comment, Products Liability: The Continued Viability
of the Learned Intermediary Rule as It Applies to Product Warnings for Prescription Drugs,
20 U. RICH. L. REv. 405, 411 (1986); Lloyd C. Chatfield II, Note, Medical Implant
Litigation and Failure to Warn: A New Extension of the Learned Intermediary Rule?, 82
Ky. L.J. 575, 590 (1993-94).
49. 370 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1966).
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nying the side effect, there is an excellent chance that injury can be
avoided. 5°
In Sterling Drug, the manufacturer was held liable because it failed
to warn either the physician or the patient.5' However, as Swayze v.
McNeil Laboratories, Inc. illustrates,52 the manufacturer's duty to warn
extends only to the physician and not the patient.13  In Swayze, the
victim suffered severe brain damage after receiving an overdose of
fentanyl, an anesthetic drug, during an operation to remove a bullet
from his leg.5" Although the manufacturer had warned the medical
profession about the dangers of administering fentanyl without adequate
supervision, the plaintiff contended that it should have provided
warnings directly to patients." The court, however, firmly rejected
this suggestion, declaring that the relationship between physician and
patient was such that the physician, not the manufacturer, should be
held responsible for advising the patient about the risks of anesthesia.5
6
Notwithstanding the fact that the learned intermediary rule is
generally applicable to prescription drugs, there are a few situations
where the courts have required manufacturers to provide direct warnings
to the ultimate consumers of their products. The first is where a patient
receives a vaccine administered as part of a mass immunization
program.57  Since there is rarely any personal contact between physi-
cians and patients in such programs, it is felt that direct warnings are
50, Id. at 85.
51. Id.
52. 807 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1987).
53. See also Anderson v. McNeilab, Inc., 831 F.2d 92, 93 (5th Cir. 1987) (prescription
drug manufacturer discharges its duty to warn when it reasonably informs prescribing
physicians of the dangers of harm from the drug); Beyette v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,
823 F.2d 990, 992 (6th Cir. 1987) (manufacturer of pharmaceutical product has a duty to
warn the medical profession, not the patient, of any risks inherent in the use of a product);
Plummer v. Lederle Labs., 819 F.2d 349, 356 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 484 U.S. 898 (1987)
(in the case of prescription drugs dispensed by physicians, manufacturer's obligation is to
warn the physician).
54. Swayze v. McNeil Labs., 807 F.2d 464, 466 (5th Cir. 1987).
55. Id. at 469.
56. Id. at 470-71.
57. See Petty v. United States, 740 F.2d 1428, 1440 (8th Cir. 1984) (swine flu vaccine
administered in mass immunization program); Reyes v. Wyeth, 498 F.2d 1264, 1270 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, .419 U.S. 1096 (1974) (polio vaccine administered through mass
immunization programn); Davis v. Wyeth Lab., 399 F.2d 121, 122 (9th Cir. 1968) (polio
vaccine administered through mass immunization program); Cunningham v. Charles Pfizer
& Co., 532 P.2d 1277, 1379 (Okla. 1975) (polio vaccine administered through mass
immunization program).
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necessary to allow patients to make informed choices about the risks
and benefits of immunization."
A few cases have exempted oral contraceptives from the reach of
the learned intermediary rule.59 For example, in MacDonald v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp., the plaintiff alleged that oral contraceptive pills
manufactured by the defendant caused a stroke.6°  Although the
manufacturer warned about the danger of "abnormal blood clotting" in
a package insert which accompanied the pills, the plaintiff argued that
the warning was not sufficient to inform her about the risk of a
stroke.6' On appeal from a jury verdict in the plaintiff's favor, the
Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed that the manufacturer owed a
duty to warn the patient directly of the dangers inherent in the use of
birth control pills.
62
However, the reasoning of the oral contraceptive cases has
generally not been extended to intrauterine devices ("IUDs"). 3 Odom
v. G.D. Searle & Co. is illustrative of the prevailing view.' The
plaintiff in Odom became sterile as the result of two ecoptic pregnancies
allegedly caused by an IUD manufactured by the defendant. 65 The
trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment.'
Affirming the lower court's decision, a federal appeals court declared
that the learned intermediary rule was applicable to IUD cases. 67 The
court concluded that the plaintiff should not be allowed to challenge to
58. Casey, supra note 47, at 949.
59. See Odgers v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 609 F. Supp. 867, 878 (E.D. Mich.
1985); Stephens v. G.D. Searle & Co., 602 F. Supp. 379, 380 (E.D. Mich. 1985);
MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 68 (Mass.), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 920 (1985).
60. MacDonald, 475 N.E.2d at 66.
61. Id. at 66-67.
62! Id. at 68.
63. See Odom v. G.D. Searle & Co., 979 F.2d 1001, 1003 (4th Cir. 1992); Allen v.
G.D. Searle & Co., 708 F. Supp. 1142, 1147-48 (D. Or. 1989); Spychala v. G.D. Searle &
Co., 705 F. Supp. 1024, 1032-33 (D. N.J. 1988); Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 680 F.
Supp. 1293, 1305-06 (D. Minn. 1988); Lacy v. G.D. Searle & Co., 567 A.2d 398, 401 (Del.
1989); Terhune v. A.H. Robins Co., 577 P.2d 975, 97 (Wash. 1978); but see Hill v. Searle
Lab., 884 F.2d 1064, 1071 (8th Cir. 1989) ("mhe trial court erred in applying the learned
intermediary rle to the facts of this case.").
64. 979 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1992).
65. Id. at 1001-02.
66. Id. at 1003.
67. Id. ("It is plain that Mrs. Odom's claim is governed by the 'learned intermediary'
doctrine.").
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the sufficiency of the warning since the manufacturer had fully informed
the physician about the risk.68
2. Medical Devices and Implants
Recently, a number of courts have extended the learned intermedi-
ary rule to medical devices and prosthetics. 69 For example, in Brooks
v. Medtronic, Inc., the plaintiff sued the manufacturer of a cardiac
pacemaker which failed shortly after being implanted in his body.7"
The failure occurred because the lead of the pacemaker became
dislodged from the plaintiff's heart tissue causing the pulse generator to
send electrical impulses at the wrong times.7 The plaintiff claimed,
inter alia, that the manufacturer was negligent because it had failed to
warn him about the risk of lead dislodgement.72
On appeal from a judgment for the defendant, the federal circuit
court concluded that the manufacturer did not have to warn the plaintiff
directly.73 The court observed that the pacemaker was chosen as the
result of an individualized decision by the plaintiff's physician in much
the same manner that chemical drugs are prescribed. 74 Distinguishing
this decisionmaking process from the dispensing of vaccines in mass
immunization programs, the court declared that "each pacemaker
candidate presents different problems requiring individualized profes-
sional judgments about lead models and generator units."75  In
addition, the court in Brooks emphasized the physician's role as a filter
of information so that cardiac patients could be protected against the
68. Id. at l0C3-04.
69. See Willett v. Baxter Int'l, 929 F.2d 1094, 1098 (5th Cir. 1991) (artificial heart
valve); Phelps v. Sherwood Med. Indus., 836 F.2d 296, 303 (7th Cir. 1987) (heart catheter);
Brooks v. Medtronic, Inc., 750 F.2d 1227, 1232 (4th Cir. 1984) (cardiac pacemaker).
Attempts by manufacturers of nonpharmaceutical products to invoke the learned
intermediary rule have been largely unsuccessful. See Hall v. Ashland Oil Co., 625 F.
Supp. 1515, 1519 (D. Conn. 1986) ('The validity of applying the learned intermediary
doctrine in the area of employer/employee relationships is far from self-evident.");
Billsborrow v. Dow Chem., U.S.A., 527 N.Y.S.2d 352, 355 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988) ("The
doctrine of responsible intermediary should not be applied to the facts of this case for the
reason that there appears to be several significant distinctions between the case of the
physician, as in Wolfgruber, and PRIDE, as in this case, which warrant such limitation.").
70. 750 F.2d 1227, 1228-29 (4th Cir. 1984).
71. Id. at 1229.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1222.
74. Id.
75. Brooks, 750 F.2d at 1232.
1996] 1199
Syracuse Law Review
undue stress.76 For these reasons, the court affirmed the lower court's
judgment for the manufacturer.77
A number of courts have also limited the manufacturer's duty to
warn in cases where medical implants or protheses are involved.78
Most of these decisions have involved silicone gel breast implants. Lee
v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. is illustrative.79 The litigation arose as the
result of injuries suffered by the plaintiff when a breast implant
ruptured.8° The plaintiff claimed that the manufacturer failed to warn
her of this risk.8' The court, however, ruled that no warning to the
patient was required as long as one was communicated to the prescrib-
ing physician. 2 The court declared that physicians were in a better
position to evaluate warnings and interpret them for their patients in the
case of implants, just as they were in the case of drugs and medical
devices.8 3 Since the manufacturer warned the plaintiff's doctor about
the risk of implant rupture, the court rejected the plaintiff's failure-to-
warn claim 4 and granted the manufacturer's motion for summary
judgment."
B. The Sophisticated User Doctrine and Related Concepts
The "sophisticated" or "knowledgeable" user doctrine relieves a
manufacturer of its duty to warn the ultimate user if the immediate
purchaser is knowledgeable about product-related hazards.86  Courts
apply this doctrine in two different situations. The first situation
involves professional users of a product. Virtually all courts agree that
the manufacturer has no duty to inform professional users about
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See Lee v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 721 F. Supp. 89, 95 (D. Md. 1989), affd
mem., 898 F.2d 146 (4th Cir. 1990) (silicone gel breast implants); Desmarais v. Dow
Coming Corp., 712 F. Supp. 13, 17-18 (D. Conn. 1989) (silicone gel breast implants);
Padgett v. Synthes, Ltd. (USA), 677 F. Supp. 1329, 1335 (W.D.N.C. 1988) (compression
plate attached to tibia bone); Perfetti v. McGhan Medical, 662 P.2d 646, 650 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1983), cert. denied, 662 P.2d 645 (N.M. 1983) (silicone gel breast implants).
79. 721 F. Supp. 89 (D. Md. 1989).
80. Id. at 91-92.
81. Id. at 94.
82. Id. at 95.
83. Id.
84. Lee, 721 F. Supp. at 95 ("Consequently,, Baxter had no duty to warn Ms. Lee, and
her claims for failure to warn must fail as a matter of law.").
85. Id. at 96.
86. See Robert E. Powell et al., The Sophisticated User Defense and Liability for
Defective Design: The Twain Must Meet, 13 1. PROD. LIAB. 113, 117 (1991).
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product-related risks that they should already know about.8" The
second situation involves knowledgeable purchasers of products
acquired for industrial or commercial use. Courts invoke the doctrine
in this context to relieve producers and suppliers of the duty to warn
employees of the purchaser8 and others about product-related risks.89
The discussion below will focus on this latter situation.
It should be noted at the outset that some courts treat the
manufacturer's duty to warn as nondelegable and, therefore, refuse to
apply the sophisticated user doctrine in any situation.90 For example,
in Sheehan v. Cincinnati Shaper Co., an injured worker brought suit
against the manufacturer of metal shearing machine that had been
87. See BecK v. Somerset Technologies, Inc., 882 F.2d 993, 997 (5th Cir. 1989)
(reasonable jury could find that experienced operator was aware of inherent danger posed
by unguarded rotating steel cylinders on rewinding machine at paper mill); Todd Shipyards
Corp. v. Hercules, Inc., 859 F.2d 1224, 1226 (5th Cir. 1988) (no duty to inform ship
repairer that thermal barrier cloth could bum); Spankle v. Bower Ammonia & Chem. Co.,
824 F.2d 409, 412-13 (5th Cir. 1987) (no duty to warn knowledgeable worker about danger
of exposure to anhydrous ammonia); Loughan v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 749 F.2d
1519, 1525 (11 th Cir. 1989) (tire manufacturer not required to inform experienced mechanic
about the danger of mismatching multipiece rim-wheel assemblies); Wansor v. George
Hantscho Co., 595 F.2d 218, 221 (5th Cir. 1979) (no duty to inform print shop employee
about danger of injury from printing press); Baughman v. General Motors Corp., 627 F.
Supp. 871, 877 (D.S.C. 1985), affd, 780 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1986) (no duty to warn tire
mechanic of the danger of explosive separation of multipiece wheel rim assembly); Bakunas
v. Life Pack, Inc., 531 F. Supp. 89, 92 (E.D. La. 1982), affd, 701 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1983)
(professional stunt man was aware of the risk of using an air cushion to absorb impact from
323-foot fall); Lockett v. General Elec. Co., 376 F. Supp. 1201, 1209 (E.D. Pa. 1974), affd,
511 F.2d 1394 (3d Cir. 1975) (supplier of driveshaft gear not required to warn shipbuilder's
employees about dangers known to assemblers' profession); McCaleb v. Mackey Paint Mfg.
Co., 343 So. 2d 511, 514 (Ala. 1977) (manufacturer of flammable liquid not required to
warn machinery operators about low flash point of product); Henderson Bros. Stores, Inc.
v. Smilely, 120 Cal. App. 3d 903, 917 (1981) (roofers were generally aware of the risk of
fire from "tar kettles" containing heated asphalt).
88. Employees are considered to be users or consumers of products purchased by their
employer as raw materials or for use in workplace. See Carole A. Cheney, Comment, Not
Just for Doctors: Applying the Learned Intermediary Doctrine to the Relationship Between
Chemical Manufacturers, Industrial Employers, and Employees, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 562,
562 (1991).
89. See Kenneth M. Willner, Note, Failures to Warn and the Sophisticated User
Defense, 74 VA. L. REV. 579, 587-88 (1988).
90. See Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 741 F.2d 656, 660 (3d Cir. 1984) ("A
holding that the manufacturer's responsibility runs to the ultimate consumer is in accordance
with Pennsylvania s justification for the imposition of strict liability, namely, risk-
spreading."); Minert v. Harsco Corp., 614 P.2d 686, 691 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980) ("We agree
that the manufacturer has a duty to warn the ultimate user of any dangers in its product
(other than those that are open and obvious). This duty is non-delegable.").
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manufactured by the defendant without a safety guard over the blade.9'
The defendant claimed that it had warned the plaintiff's employer about
the danger and had offered to install a safety guard on the machine. 92
The court, however, refused to exculpate the defendant on this basis and
declared that the defendant had a duty to warn the plaintiff, the ultimate
user of the product, and thus, its alleged warning to the plaintiff's
employer was not sufficient to impute knowledge of the risk to the
plaintiff.93 Consequently, the court in Sheehan affirmed a jury verdict
for the plaintiff.94
Another group of courts recognize the sophisticated user defense
in negligence actions, but reject the doctrine when it is raised in strict
products liability cases.95 The apparent basis for this distinction is that
under a theory of strict liability, knowledge that an employer will fail
to warn its employees is imputed to a manufacturer by means of a
hindsight test, whereas under negligence principles, a manufacturer
should not be held responsible for an employer's failure to warn as long
as the manufacturer's reliance is reasonable.96 As a New Jersey.
intermediate appellate court explained in Olencki v. Mead Chemical Co.:
Knowledge of the risk that employers may not adequately warn their
employees is imputed to the defendants in a strict liability action.
Thus, in a strict liability action against a manufacturer, the manufac-
turer cannot be absolved of the duty to warn. However, under
negligence law, knowledge of the risk that an employer will not
warn its employees is not imputed to a manufacturer.97
Thus, in states which distinguish between negligence and strict liability,
plaintiffs can avoid the sophisticated user doctrine by predicating their
91. 555 A.2d 1352, 1354 (Pa. Super. Ct.), appeal denied, 564 A.2d 1261 (Pa. 1989).
92. Id. at 1354-55.
93. Id. at 1355.
94. Id. at 1356.
95. See Whitehead v. St. Joe Lead Co., 729 F.2d 238, 253 (3d Cir. 1984) ("Because
knowledge of the risk that the vendee may not warn is imputed under section 402A, such
cases have no applicability to strict liability for failure to warn."); Russo v. Abex Corp., 670
F. Supp. 206, 207 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (citing Menna v. Johns-Manville Corp., 585 F. Supp.
1178, 1184-85 (D.N.J. 1984), aff'd, 772 F.2d 895 (3d Cir. 1985)) ("Mhe [sophisticated
user] defense does not exist under strict liability in tort principles because, in that context,
a seller is duty-bound to warn all foreseeable users and the risk of an employer's failure to
warn employees is one of the risks imputed to the seller as a matter of law.").
96. See Menna, 585 F. Supp. at 1185 ("As knowledge of the risk that Owens-Coming
may not warn its employees is imputed to [the] defendants [under strict liability], they
cannot absolve themselves of this duty [to warn] by relying on Owens-Coming's
sophistication.").
97. 507 A.2d 803, 806 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1986).
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failure-to-warn claims on strict liability instead of relying on negligence
as a liability theory.
1. The Duty Approach and the Balancing of Factors Approach
Courts that recognize the sophisticated user doctrine generally
apply one of two approaches.9" Under the "duty" approach, the duty
to warn shifts to each succeeding purchaser of the product.99 Thus, a
manufacturer who provides adequate safety information to its immediate
vendee thereby satisfies its duty to warn and is not responsible if that
information fails to reach end users of the product.'t° The second
approach relies on the balancing test employed by section 388, comment
n, of the Restatement.' °' Under this approach, a manufacturer who
provides safety information to its immediate vendee is relieved of
liability only if its conduct is deemed to be reasonable in light of the
factors enumerated in comment n."°2
98. One student commentator identified a third position which he describes as a
"mixed duty/Restatement approach." See Willner, supra note 89, at 605-06. Under this
approach, a court balances a variety of factors to determine whether the producer's or
supplier's reliance on the intermediary was reasonable. Willner, supra note 89, at 605-06.
If this reliance is determined to be reasonable, the court would then conclude that the
producer or supplier had no duty to provide direct warnings to end users of the product.
Willner, supra note 89, at 605-06.
99. See Cook v. Branick Mfg., 736 F.2d 1442 (1 Ith Cir. 1984).
100. See id. at 1446 ("[Wjhenever a third party has a duty to warn of a dangerous
condition in the workplace, that duty is discharged by informing the employer of the
dangerous condition-waming to each of the employer's individual employees who may be
threatened by the dangerous condition then becomes the responsibility of the employer.");
Younger v. Dow Coming Corp., 451 P.2d 177, 184 (Kan. 1969) ("mhe manufacturer of
a product which is potentially hazardous to health and who gives adequate warning of such
potential hazard, by label or otherwise, to its immediate vendee, an industrial user, has no
additional duty to warn the vendee's employee of such hazards, and is not liable in a
negligence action to such employee for failure to do so.") (emphasis in original); Jodway
v. Kennametal, Inc., 525 N.W.2d 883, 889 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) ("mhe suppliers could
reasonably rely on the purchaser/employer to warn its employees without the suppliers
having actual knowledge that such warnings were indeed being given.").
101. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 cmt. n (1965).
102. See O'Neal v. Celanese Corp., 10 F.3d 249, 252 (4th Cir. 1993); Sowell v.
American Cyanamid Co., 888 F.2d 802, 803-04 (11 th Cir. 1989); Oman v. Johns-Manville
Corp., 764 F.2d 224, 233 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 970 (1985); Jones v. Meat
Packers Equip. Co., 723 F.2d 370, 374 (4th Cir. 1983); Gordon v. Niagara Mach. & Tool
Works, 574 F.2d 1182, 1188-89 (5th Cir. 1978); Griggs v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,
513 F.2d 851, 858 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865 (1975); Reibold v. Simon Aerials,
Inc., 859 F. Supp. 1 93, 200 (E.D. Va. 1994); Byrd v. Brush Wellman, Inc., 753 F. Supp.
1403, 1404-05 (E.D. Tenn. 1990); Morsberger v. Uniking Conveyor Corp., 647 F. Supp.
1297, 1299 (W.D. Va. 1986); Russell v. GAF Corp., 422 A.2d 989, 992 (D.C. 1980);
Square D Co. v. Hayson, 621 So. 2d 1373, 1377-78 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Tasca v.
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a. The Duty Approach
A number of states employ a duty analysis in connection with the
sophisticated user doctrine. 0 3 In these states, the manufacturer's duty
ordinarily runs only to its immediate vendee; the vendee, in turn, is
required to warn the next party in the chain of distribution."°I Fur-
thermore, even if the manufacturer does not provide adequate product
safety to its vendee, it is still relieved of liability if its vendee is already
aware of the risk and fails to warn end users of the product 5
GTE Prods. Corp., 438 N.W.2d 625, 628 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988).
103. See Willner, supra note 89, at 590.
104. See Willner, supra note 89, at 591-92.
105. See Scallan v. Duriron Co., I1 F.3d 1249, 1252 (5th Cir. 1994) (pump
manufacturer not required to warn about danger of inhaling chlorine); Washington v.
Department of Transp., 8 F.3d 296, 300-01 (5th Cir. 1993) (manufacturer of wet-dry
vacuum cleaner owed no duty to warn employee of sophisticated user, such as plaintiffs
employer, about danger of explosion from sparks emitted by the vacuum cleaner); Rusin v.
Glendale Optical Co., 805 F.2d 650, 654 (6th Cir. 1986) (maker of protective eyeglasses is
not obligated to inform employee about the superior impact resistance of plastic glasses
when employer was "independently skilled in the intricacies of protective spectacles");
Marshall v. H.K. Ferguson Co., 623 F.2d 882, 887 (4th Cir. 1980) (suit against manufacturer
of brewing equipment dismissed because employer was knowledgeable about operation of
the equipment); McWaters v. Steel Serv. Co., 597 F.2d 79, 80 (6th Cir. 1979) (supplier of
steel rods not liable for failing to warn construction company employee that improperly
"guyed" rods might collapse); Jacobson v. Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp., 409 F.2d 1263,
1271-72 (9th Cir. 1969) (manufacturer of steel strand was not required to warn that the
strand might snap during pre-stressing operation when victim's employer was already aware
of the risk); Marker v. Universal Oil Prods., 250 F.2d 603, 606 (10th Cir. 1957) (supplier
of catalyst used in construction of petroleum refining vessel not required to warn victim's
employer about danger of asphyxiation from carbon monoxide gas generated by the
catalyst); Cruz v. Texaco, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 777, 780 (S.D. Ili. 1984) (seller of truck
designed to transport heavy equipment had no duty to warn employee of truck company
when employer was already aware of danger of driving truck too fast); Littlehale v. E.I.
DuPont de Nemours Co., 268 F. Supp. 791, 799 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (supplier of blasting caps
not required to warn end users when employer was already aware of dangers associated with
product); In re Asbestos Litig. (Mergenthaler), 542 A.2d 1205, 1211-12 (Del. Super. Ct.
1986) (asbestos suppliers could rely on employer, who was a sophisticated purchaser, to
protect its employees against harm); Stiltjes v. Ridco Exterminating Co., 343 S.E.2d 715,
719 (Ga. Ct. App.), aff'd on other grounds, 347 S.E.2d 568 (Ga. 1986) (supplier of
pesticides to professional pesticide control operator had no duty to warn vendee's employees
against danger of exposure to pyrethrins); Mays v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 661 P.2d 348, 365
(Kan. 1983) (suppliers of pipe for gas pipeline have no duty to warn pipeline employees
about the risk of gas explosions); Slate v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 510 N.E.2d 249, 252
(Mass. 1987) (repairer of press was entitled to rely on employer to protect employees
against injury from machine).
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Davis v. Avondale Industries provides a good illustration of the
duty approach.' 6 In Davis, a welder, who contracted lung disease as
the result of inhaling fumes from the use of cadmium-based brazing
rods, brought suit against the rods' manufacturer. 0 7 The plaintiff
contended that the manufacturer should have warned her about the
dangers of fumes emitted by the brazing rods.'08 It appears that the
defendant did not warn either the plaintiff or her employer but assumed
that the employer would act to protect its employees.' 9 The trial
court refused the defendant's proposed instruction on the sophisticated
user doctrine and the jury held in the plaintiff's favor. ° However,
this decision was reversed on appeal."'
The federal appeals court agreed with the defendant that the
plaintiff's employer was a sophisticated purchaser and user of cadmium-
based brazing rods and, as such, should have been familiar with the
product's inherent risks." 2 In addition, the court found that since its
vendee owed an independent duty to maintain a safe workplace
environment, the defendant could reasonably assume that the employer
would take adequate precautions to assure the safety of its employ-
ees.1 3 Under these circumstances, the court ruled, the manufacturer
was not required to take any action on its own to protect the vendee's
employees.'
b. The Restatement's Balancing of Factors Approach
The balancing of factors approach, which is based on the Restate-
ment section 388, comment n, focuses on the overall reasonableness of
the manufacturer's conduct.' According to comment n, one factor
106. 975 F.2d 169 (5th Cir. 1992).
107. Id. at 171.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 174.
110. Id. at 171.
I1. Davis, 975 F.2d at 175.
112. Id. at 174.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See Oman v. Johns-Manville Corp., 764 F.2d 224, 233 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 970 (1985) ("'These considerations [set forth in comment n] must be balanced to
determine if the manufacturer owes a duty to place a warning on his product."); Jones v.
Meat Packers Equip. Co., 723 F.2d 370, 374 (4th Cir. 1983) ("It was for the jury to
determine in light of the factors mentioned in comment n ... whether [the product
manufacturer] acted reasonably in relying on [the buyer] to warn its employees."); Reibold
v. Simon Aerials, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 193, 201 (E.D. Va. 1994) ("The manufacturer still has
a duty to balance the factors in comment n, including the burden of placing a warning
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is the reliability of the intermediary. Although the supplier may not rely
upon an intermediary who is known to be irresponsible,' 6 comment
n declares that the supplier may ordinarily assume that the intermediary
will act responsibly and rely on him or her to convey a warning to the
actual user."' 7 The magnitude of the risk is another factor. Comment
n provides that the supplier must exercise even greater care in the
selection of an intermediary if the chattel is likely to be extremely
hazardous to the user without a proper warning.'" Furthermore,
according to comment n, there are situations where the risk is so great
that the supplier may not rely on an intermediary at all, but must
provide a direct warning to the user of the chattel. 1 9 The third, and
final, factor is the burden or expense to the supplier of direct disclosure
of safety information to the ultimate user of the chattel. Comment n
observes that it may be necessary in some cases for the supplier to
convey warnings directly to the users of chattels by means of appropri-
ate labels or packaging. 2 ' The assumption is that these forms of
direct communication are more reliable than intermediaries and,
sign."); Menna v. Johns-Manville Corp., 585 F. Supp.1178, 1185 (D.N.J. 1984), af'd, 772
F.2d 895 (3d Cir. 1985) ('The question of whether defendants acted reasonably in relying
on [the purchaser] to warn its employees is thus an appropriate inquiry under the language
of § 388 of the Restatement.").
116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 cmt. n (1965) ("In such a case, the
supplier may well be required to go further than to tell such a third person of the dangerous
character of the article, or, if he fails to do so, to take the risk of being subjected to liability
if the information is not brought home to those whom the supplier should expect to use the
chattel.").
117. Id. ("If the chattel is one which if ignorantly used contains no great chance of
causing anything more than some comparatively trivial harm, it is reasonable to permit the
one who supplies the chattel through a third person to rely on the fact that the third person
is an ordinary normal man to whose discredit the supplier knows nothing, as a sufficient
assurance that information given to him will be passed on to those who are to use the
chattel.").
118. Id. ("Thus, while it may be proper to permit a supplier to assume that one
through whom he supplies a chattel which is only slightly dangerous will communicate the
information given him to those who are known to use it unless he knows that the other is
careless, it may be improper to permit him to trust the conveyance of the necessary
information of the actual character of a highly dangerous article to a third person of whose
character he knows nothing.")
119. Id. ("[I]f the danger involved in the ignorant use of the particular chattel is very
great, it may be that the supplier does not exercise reasonable care in entrusting the
communication of the necessary information even to a person whom he has good reason to
believe to be careful.").
120. Id.. ("Where the danger involved in the ignorant use of their quality is great and
such means of disclosure are practicable and not unduly burdensome, it may well be that
the supplier should be required to adopt them.").
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therefore, should be used when they are not unduly burdensome to the
supplier.
Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. Balbos, decided by the Maryland
Court of Appeals in 1992, provides a good example of this balancing
of factors approach.12' In Eagle-Picher, the personal representatives
of two shipyard workers who died of mesothelioma brought suit against
various suppliers of asbestos insulation products. 122  The plaintiffs
argued that the defendants failed to provide adequate warnings to the
workers about the dangers of exposure to asbestos fibers. 23  The
defendants could not show that they provided any warnings between
1942 and 1944, the period during which the decedents were exposed to
asbestos. 124 The court found that the defendants should have known
at that time about the health risks of exposure to asbestos." At trial,
the defendants sought to present a sophisticated user defense, arguing
that the decedents' employer, Bethlehem Steel Corporation, was aware
of the health risks of asbestos and was in a better position to warn its
workers. 126 However, the trial court ruled that the sophisticated user
doctrine was not applicable to the facts of the case,127 and the jury
returned a verdict for the plaintiffs. 28
On appeal, the Maryland court emphasized that the Restatement
approach focused on the defendant's conduct, not on the intermediary's
conduct. 29 Consequently, the fact that the intermediary was aware of
the danger did not automatically relieve the supplier of its duty to warn
the ultimate user of the product.' 30 Instead, the court considered a
variety of factors to determine whether it was reasonable for the
supplier to rely on intermediaries to warn the end users of the prod-
uct.' 3' According to the court, those factors included:
(1) [The dangerous condition of the product; (2) the purpose for
which the product is used; (3) the form of any warnings given; (4)
121. 604 A.2d 445 (Md. 1992).
122. Id. at 449,
123. Id.
124. id. at 465.
125. Id. at 453.
126. Eagle-Picher, 604 A.2d at 463-64.
127. Id. at 464,
128. Id. at 448. The trial court's judgment was affirmed by an intermediate appellate
court. See Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Balbos, 578 A.2d 228 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990).
129. Eagle-Picher, 604 A.2d at 464.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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the reliability of the third party as a conduit of necessary information
about the product; (5) the magnitude of the risk involved; and (6) the
burdens imposed on the supplier by requiring that he directly warn
all users. 13
2
A review of these factors supported the trial court's conclusion that
the facts of the case did not justify submission of the sophisticated user
doctrine to the jury.133 First, the defendants knew at the time that
asbestos products were inherently dangerous.3 In addition, the
defendants knew that the products would be sawed, broken, ripped,
crushed and stirred by shipyard employees as a part of normal
construction activities, thereby making exposure to asbestos dust a
virtual certainty.135  Moreover, the defendants made no attempt to
warn either Bethlehem or its employees during the period in ques-
tion. 136  Furthermore, the defendants had no reason to believe that
Bethlehem was aware of the dangers of exposure to asbestos insulation
products. 137  The defendant knew that the magnitude of the risk of
exposure to asbestos was extremely high involving as it did the
likelihood of serious lung disease or even death. 138  Finally, the
burden of providing direct warnings to Bethlehem's employees was not
unreasonably great because the products arrived at the workplace in
forms such as blocks, tubing, blankets, cloth and powder, to which
labels could be easily affixed. 39  Accordingly, the court in Eagle-
Picher upheld the compensatory damage awards for the plaintiffs.' 40
2. Particular Applications of the Sophisticated User Doctrine and
Related Principles
The sophisticated user doctrine has been invoked in a variety of
situations. The majority of cases involve industrial machinery and other
products designed for workplace use. 4' However, courts have applied
132. Id. (quoting Kennedy v. Mobay Corp., 579 A.2d 1191, 1195 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1990)).
133. Id. at 465.
134. Eagle-Picher, 604 A.2d at 458, 464.
135. Id. at 457-58.
136. Id. at 465.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 453.
139. Eagle-Picher, 604 A.2d at 458, 464
140. Id. at 473.
141. See, e.g., Washington v. Department of Transp., 8 F.3d 296 (5th Cir. 1993);
Rusin v. Glendale Optical Co., 805 F.2d 650 (6th Cir. 1986); Jones v. Meat Packers Equip.
Co., 723 F.2d 370 (4th Cir. 1983); Hopkins v. Chip-in-Saw, Inc., 630 F.2d 616 (8th Cir.
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a similar concept to the sale of component parts. 42 In addition, those
who supply products in bulk form to manufacturers for further
processing have also relied on a variant of the sophisticated user
doctrine to limit their duty to warn end users of their products.'43
a. Products Designed for Industrial Use
The sophisticated user doctrine is expressly invoked most often in
cases which involve industrial machinery or other products used in a
workplace environment. Cases which follow the duty approach tend to
exculpate product manufacturers, whether they warn their immediate
vendees or not, on the theory that the vendee, usually an employer, is
or should be aware of the risk involved and should be primarily
responsible for protecting its employees against the risk.
For example, in Washington v. Department of Transportation, a
worker brought an action against Shop-Vac, the manufacturer of a wet-
dry vacuum cleaner alleging that it failed to provide adequate warn-
ings.' 44 The plaintiff was injured when sparks from the machine
ignited acetone vapors present at the job site. 45  Applying the duty
test, the court concluded that Shop-Vac owed no duty to warn the
plaintiff since his employer, OTECH, was already aware of the danger
1980); Marshall v. H.K. Ferguson Co., 623 F.2d 882 (4th Cir. 1980); McWaters v. Steel
Serv. Co., 597 F.2d 79 (6th Cir. 1979); Reibold v. Simon Aerials, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 193
(E.D. Va. 1994); Hendricks v. Comerio Ercole, 763 F. Supp. 505 (D. Kan. 1991);
Morsberger v. Uniking Conveyor Corp., 647 F. Supp. 1297 (W.D. Va. 1986); Cruz v.
Texaco, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 777 (S.D. 11. 1984); Square D Co. v. Hayson, 621 So. 2d 1373
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Slate v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 510 N.E.2d 249 (Mass. 1987).
142. See, e.g., Apperson v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 41 F.3d 1103, 1108 (7th
Cir. 1994); In re TMJ Implants Prod. Liab. Litig., 872 F. Supp. 1019, 1028-33 (D. Minn.
1995); Kalinowski v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 851 F. Supp. 149, 157 (E.D. Pa.
1994); Hegna v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 825 F. Supp. 880, 884 (D. Minn. 1993),
affd, 27 F.3d 571 (8th Cir. 1994); Orion Ins. Co. v. United Technologies Corp., 502 F.
Supp. 173, 178 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Lockett v. General Elec. Co., 376 F. Supp. 1201, 1209
(E.D. Pa. 1974), aff'a, 511 F.2d 1393 (3d Cir. 1975).
143. See, e.g., Smith v. Walter C. Best, Inc., 927 F.2d 736, 739 (3d Cir. 1990); Adkins
v. GAF Corp., judgment affd in part, vacated in part, 923 F.2d 1225, 1229-30 (6th Cir.
1991); Newson v. Monsanto Co., 869 F. Supp. 1255, 1259 (E.D. Mich. 1994); Sara Lee
Corp. v. Homasote Co., 719 F. Supp. 417, 420 (D. Md. 1989); Kennedy v. Mobay Corp.,
579 A.2d 1191, 1206 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990), aff'd per curiam, 601 A.2d 123 (Md.
1992); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Ralph Wilson Plastics Co., 509 N.W.2d 520, 523
(Mich. Ct. App. 1993); Todalen v. United States Chem. Co., 424 N.W.2d 73, 79 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1988); Munoz v. Gulf Oil Co., 732 S.W.2d 62, 66 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987); House v.
Armour of Am., Inc., 886 P.2d 542, 549 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
144. 8 F.3d 296, 298 (5th Cir. 1993).
145, Id.
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of operating power equipment such as the vacuum in the presence of
acetone vapors.146 The court also observed that OTECH was already
under a statutory duty to warn its employees about this sort of risk. 47
The court in Singleton v. Manitowoc, Inc. employed similar
reasoning. 4' In that case, a worker was injured when a crane rotated
on its base, trapping the plaintiff's hand between the crane's superstruc-
ture and a toolbox affixed to the crane.'4 9 The plaintiff brought suit
against the manufacturer of the crane, alleging, inter alia, that it failed
to warn about the existence of blind spots on the crane. 50 The court
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment,' 5' concluding
that the manufacturer should not be required to warn end users of the
product when it provided adequate safety information to the user's
employer, particularly when it was reasonable to assume that the
employer would pass this information on to its employees. 52
Due to the fact-specific nature of the Restatement's balancing of
factors test, courts which adhere to this approach are more likely to send
failure-to-warn cases to the jury than courts which employ the duty
approach.153  Jones v. Meat Packers Equipment Co. is illustrative.'
5 4
The plaintiff in Jones was injured while cleaning a meat mixing
machine at her place of employment. 55 The injury occurred because
the machine activated itself even though the stop button had been
pushed. 56  The manufacturer was aware of the danger and had
146. Id. at 299-300.
147. Id. at 300.
148. 727 F. Supp. 217 (D. Md. 1989).
149. Id. at 219.
150. Id. at 222.
151. Id. at 227-28.
152. Id. at 226 ("When, as here, a manufacturer provides its product to a knowledge-
able, industrial user and it is reasonable to expect the user to pass on warnings to his
employees who operate or work with the product, then the manufacturer is relieved of the
duty to warn employees of risks and dangers of which the user could reasonably be
expected to be aware.").
153. See Sowell v. American Cyanamid Co., 888 F.2d 802, 804 (1 1th Cir. 1989)
(reversing trial court judgment n.o.v. for defendant); Reibold v. Simon Aerials, Inc., 859 F.
Supp. 193, 201 (E.D. Va. 1994) (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment); Sharp
v. Wyatt, Inc., 627 A.2d 1347, 1363 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993), aftd, 644 A.2d 871 (Conn.
1994) (reversing lower court's grant of defendant's motion for summary judgment); Russell
v. GAF Corp., 422 A.2d 989, 992 (D.C. 1980) (reversing directed verdict for defendant);
Macrie v. SDS Biotech Corp., 630 A.2d 805, 810-11 (N.J. Super. 1993) (reversing summary
judgment for defendant).
154. 723 F.2d 370 (4th Cir. 1983).
155. Id. at 37 1.
156. Id.
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warned the plaintiff's employer about it several years prior to the
accident. 5 7 The employer, however, failed to pass this information
on to its employees.' 58 The plaintiff contended that warning her
employer by letter was not enough and that the manufacturer should
have affixed some sort of warning label to the machine itself.'59
The trial court told the jury that an adequate warning to the
plaintiff's employer was sufficient and that the defendant had no duty
to warn users of the machine directly.16 The jury found in favor of
the defendant manufacturer. 61 On appeal, the court observed the duty
to warn was governed by section 388 of the Restatement and the factors
set forth in comment n.' 62  The court concluded that under the
Restatement's approach "a factual issue arises about the adequacy of a
warning to an intermediary rather than to the person directly exposed to
the danger."'163 According to the court, the jury, not the trial court,
should have determined whether the defendant acted reasonably in
relying on the plaintiff's employer to warn its employees about the
danger.'" Therefore, the court reversed the lower court's judgment
and remanded the case for a new trial.'65
A federal district recently reached a similar result in Reibold v.
Simon Aerials, Inc.'66 In that case, a mechanic whose hand was cut
by an unshielded cooling fan blade in the engine of an aerial lift
machine brought suit against the machine's manufacturer. 167 The
plaintiff alleged that the manufacturer was negligent because it failed to
inform him of the risk posed by the cooling fan. 68 The defendant
moved for summary judgment on the plaintiff's failure to warn claim on
the theory that the plaintiff's employer, Hertz, was a sophisticated user
of the product. 69 While acknowledging that Hertz was a sophisticat-
ed user, the court declared that the defendant manufacturer still had "a
duty to balance the factors in comment n, including the burden of
157. Id. at 372.
158. Id.
159. Jones, 722 F.2d at 373.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 371.
162. Id. at 373 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 cmt. n (1965)).
163. Id. at 374.
164. Jones, 722 F.2d at 374.
165. Id.
166. 859 F. Supp. 193 (E.D. Va. 1994).
167. Id. at 194.
168. Id. at 196.
169. Id. at 200.
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placing a warning sign [on the product]."'7 ° The court concluded that
the record was not sufficiently complete at this stage of the proceeding
to determine whether the defendant met the requirement of comment
n. 171  Accordingly, it denied the defendant's motion for summary
judgment on the ground of sophisticated user.17
It should be noted that courts will sometimes rule as a matter of
law that a defendant has satisfied its duty to warn under the
Restatement's balancing of factors approach.173 O'Neal v. Celanese
Corp. provides an interesting example of this. 74 0 'Neal involved a
suit by a welder who suffered lead poisoning when he inhaled fumes
from lead-based paint. 75  The plaintiff's employer purchased the
contents of a factory owned by the defendant, Celanese Corpora-
tion. 7 6 These contents included a number of spinning machines used
to weave acetate yarn. 177 A primer and sealant compound known as
"red lead" had been used on the machine, although this was not visible
until they were partially dismantled.1 78 The plaintiff was exposed to
lead fumes when he used a cutting torch to dismantle one of the
spinning machines. 79
The plaintiff claimed that Celanese breached its duty to warn him
about the presence of red lead in the interior of the machines.8 At
trial, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff on the liability issue,
but the court rendered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor
of the defendant.' 8' On appeal,- the federal circuit court considered six
factors. 2 In its evaluation of the first two factors, the court conclud-
ed that the product was not inherently dangerous, but would become so
only if a worker used a torch to cut up the machine without wearing
170. Id. at 201.
171. Reibold, 859 F. Supp. at 201.
172. Id. (summary judgment granted on breach of warranty ground).
173. See, e.g., Byrd v. Brush Wellman, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 1403, 1413 (E.D. Tenn.
1990); Morsberger v. Uniking Conveyor Corp., 647 F. Supp. 1297, 1299 (W.D. Va. 1986);
Tasca v. GTE Prods. Corp., 438 N.W.2d 625, 629 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988).
174. 10 F.3d 249 (4th Cir. 1993).
175. Id. at 249.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 250.
178. Id.
179. O'Neal, 10 F.3d at 250.
180. Id. at 249.
181. Id. at 249-50.
182. Id. at 252.
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protective equipment. 1 3  Moreover, the plaintiff's employer had
extensive experience concerning salvage operations of this type and
could be expected to recognize the existence of lead paint, and the
dangers associated with it, when the welding operation first revealed the
distinctive red-orange color of red lead paint.' Furthermore, the
court found that Celanese had warned the plaintiff's employer about
those hazards that were unique to the factory and its equipment.'85
Finally, the court concluded that since the sale included thousands of
different pieces of equipment in the plant, it would have been impracti-
cal for Celanese to have provided warnings about the hazards associated
with each individual item.8 6 Consequently, the appeals court held as
a matter of law that the defendant was not required to warn the plaintiff
about the existence or dangers of red lead paint on the machines that it
sold to the plaintiff's employer. 8 7
b. Component Parts
Most courts impose liability on the suppliers of defective compo-
nent parts which are incorporated into larger pieces of machinery.'
At the same time, suppliers of nondefective component or replacement
parts are generally immune from design defect liability for injuries that
result in a defect in the final product.'8 9 This same reasoning is
183. Id. at 252.
184. O'Neal, 10 F.3d at 252-53.
185. Id. at 253-54.
186. id. at 254
187. Id.
188. See Kuziw v. Lake Eng'g Co., 586 F.2d 33, 36-37 (7th Cir. 1978) (judgment
n.o.v. reversed for rianufacturer of hydraulic control valve incorporated into paper baling
machine because plaintiff introduced testimony at trial that valve might be defectively
designed); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 845 F. Supp. 1122, 1126 (M.D.N.C. 1994)
(rejecting defendant's motion for summary judgment in light of allegation by plaintiff's
expert that defendant, supplied defective rubber hoses to manufacturer of mobile food service
vehicle); Scott v. Allen Bradley Co., 362 N.W.2d 734, 739 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (lower
court judgment for plaintiff against supplier of defectively designed punch press safety
switch affirmed on appeal).
189. See Childress v. Gresen Mfg. Co., 888 F.2d 45, 49 (6th Cir. 1989) (summary
judgment affirmed on appeal for supplier of nondefective hydraulic valve incorporated into
log-splitter); Cropper v. Rego Distrib. Ctr., Inc., 542 F. Supp. 1142, 1156 (D. Del. 1982)
(supplier of nondefective valve not liable to injured worker because employer failed to
employ locking system on hose when unloading anhydrous ammonia from tank car); Orion
Ins. Co. v. United Technologies Corp., 502 F. Supp. 173, 178 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (summary
judgment allowed for manufacturer of stationary star mechanism for helicopter designed
according to helicopter manufacturer's specifications); Shaw v. General Motors Corp., 727
P.2d 387, 391 (CoIc. Ct. App. 1986) (no liability for manufacturer of dump truck chassis
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applicable to suppliers of replacement component parts which are
installed after the finished product has left the manufacturer's con-
trol.19
°
The issue is less clear, however, whether the supplier of an
otherwise nondefective part can be held liable under a failure to warn
theory when it relies on the manufacturer of the finished product to
provide safety information about the product to the ultimate user. It
should be noted at the outset that courts rarely mention the sophisticated
user doctrine by name in component part cases. Instead, courts usually
focus on the component part supplier's knowledge of the risk and its
control over the finished product and seldom emphasize the sophistica-
tion or reliability of the intermediary. 19' Nevertheless, the situation
of component part suppliers is similar to that of suppliers of industrial
machinery and bulk products in the sense that another party in the
distributive chain is often in a better position to warn end users. For
this reason, it seems appropriate to include component part suppliers in
this discussion of the sophisticated user doctrine.
Courts in component supplier cases take one of two approaches.
Most courts hold that it is the responsibility of the manufacturer of the
finished product, not the supplier of a nondefective component part, to
warn the ultimate user about risks associated with the finished
product.' 92 These courts emphasize the fact that suppliers of compo-
for failure to install back-up alarm on finished vehicle); Wenrick v. Schloemann-Siemag
Aktiengesellschaft, 522 A.2d 52, 59 (Pa. Super. 1987) (judgment against manufacturer of
nondefective electrical system for punch press reversed on appeal); Davis v. Dresser Indus.,
Inc., 800 S.W.2d 369, 370 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (summary judgment affirmed for supplier
of nondefective component parts for oil rig).
190. See Wright v. Federal Mach. Co., 535 F. Supp. 645, 649-50 (E.D. Pa. 1982)
(summary judgment granted for supplier of nondefective "'wringer" rollers to owner of 50-
year-old leather press).
191. But see Orion, 502 F. Supp. at 178 (granting summary judgment for component
part supplier when the assembler had expertise); Sliman v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 731 P.2d
1267, 1272 (Idaho 1986) (holding in a component supplier case, that "reasonable assurance"
that the intermediary would convey a warning was a jury question).
192. See Lockett v. General Elec. Co., 376 F. Supp. 1201, 1209 (E.D. Pa. 1974), afftd,
511 F.2d 1394 (3d Cir. 1975) ("Since a supplier of a component part is under no duty to
warn the subsequent assembler of dangers which are generally known in the assembler's
profession, the supplier has no duty to warn the assembler's employees."); Lee v. Butcher
Boy, 215 Cal. Rptr. 195-202 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) ("mhe manufacturer of the finished
product is in the best position to protect against and warn of the danger that arises after the
nondefective component part is installed in the finished product."); Jacobini v. V. & O.
Press Co., 588 A.2d 476, 480 (Pa. 1991) ("Thus, we perceive no basis for requiring the
component part manufacturer ... to investigate the use of its part ... which by itself was
inert and safe.").
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nent parts seldom have any control over the design of the finished
product.1 93 Other courts, however, are more willing to require suppli-
ers of component parts to warn end users of finished products,
particularly when they are aware of the risk their product will pose
when it is incorporated into a larger product by another manufac-
turer.194 These courts are more likely to send such cases to the jury
rather than granting requests by defendants for summary judgments.' 95
Searls v. Doe is illustrative of the former approach.' 96 In that
case, an employee of a brewery brought suit against the suppliers of
component parts for conveyor system. 97 The plaintiff was injured
when he stepped on a can that had fallen onto the floor from an
accumulator table after being ejected from the conveyor line by an
electronic inspection device.198  Affirming a lower court's summary
judgment for the defendants, the court declared that the component part
manufacturers had no duty to warn about potential design defects in the
conveyor system when they had not participated in the system's
design.' 99 The court reached this conclusion in spite of the fact that
the plaintiff presented evidence that indicated that both defendants
should have known that cans might overflow from the accumulator table
and fall onto the floor, thus becoming a hazard to employees. 200
193. See Sperry v. Bauermeister, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 1134, 1140 (E.D. Mo. 1992)
("Defendant had no connection with the design or installation of the electrical system which
would have included an interlock safeguard and/or a warning light; consequently it had no
duty to warn plaintiff of any dangerous condition of the electrical system or the overall
design of the mill."); Vines v. Beloit Corp., 631 So. 2d 1003, 1006 (Ala. 1994) ("It is clear
that Scott Paper retained control over its plant and equipment and that Beloit did not have
the power to force Scott Paper to paint its floors orange, install warning signs in the mill,
or adopt particular safety practices.").
194. See Koonce v. Quaker Safety Prod. & Mfg., 798 F.2d 700, 715 (5th Cir. 1986)
(holding that supplier of safety suit could be held liable failing to warn user even if suit was
considered to be a component of an interrelated safety system); Roy v. Star Chopper Co.,
584 F.2d 1124, 1128 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 916 (1979) (supplier of pinch
rollers for electroplating machine subject to liability for failure to warn); Beauchamp v.
Russell, 547 F. Supp. 1191, 1198 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (supplier of component part for
casestacker machine subject to liability under failure to warn theory).
195. See Beauchamp, 547 F. Supp. at 1198-99 (motion for summary judgment rejected
where supplier of air pressure valve installed in casestacker machine failed to provide
instructions on how to bleed air pressure out of valve); Sliman, 731 P.2d at 1272 (affirming
jury verdict for plaintiff against supplier of soft drink bottle cap).
196. 505 N.E.2d 287 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986).
197. Id. at 288.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 290.
200. Id. at 289-90.
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Maake v. Ross Operating Valve Co. exemplifies the latter
approach.°1 In that case, the plaintiff, who was injured while operat-
ing a 30-ton power press, sued the supplier of a "Handsaver valve" and
two palm buttons which had been installed on the machine. 2
Although the plaintiff had not depressed the palm buttons, the ram
mechanism went through another power stroke and smashed his
hands.2°3 The plaintiff claimed that the defendant should have warned
about the need to install additional safety equipment on the power press
to prevent unexpected recycling by the machine.2' The court ob-
served that the defendant was aware that its products were commonly
used on power presses and that it could foresee the type of injury that
in fact occurred. °5 In the court's view this knowledge was sufficient
to present a jury issue as to whether the valve and palm buttons were
unreasonably dangerous without a waming.2°6
c. Raw Materials and Bulk Products
Many courts hold that a bulk seller, whose products are not sold
in packages or containers that can be readily labeled, fulfills its duty to
warn when it conveys information about product-related risks to its
immediate vendee.2' A number of courts have expressly referred to
the sophisticated or knowledgeable user doctrine in such cases,208
201. 717 P.2d 923 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
202. Id. at 924.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 925.
205. Id. at 926.
206. Maake, 717 P.2d at 926.
207. See Forest v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 791 F. Supp. 1460, 1465 ("[A]
bulk supplier who supplies a dangerous product to a sophisticated purchaser cannot be held
liable for not warning the ultimate users of the product of its dangers."); Cohen v. Steve's
Ice Cream, 737 F. Supp. 8, 9 (D. Mass. 1990) ("[A] bulk seller has no duty... to issue
warnings to the ultimate consumer, when sufficient warning has been given to the
immediate purchaser."); Higgins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 671 F. Supp. 1055,
1061 (D. Md. 1987), af)fd, 863 F.2d 1162 (4th Cir. 1988) ('There is no duty on product
suppliers to warn ultimate users (whether employees or customers) of product-related
hazards in products supplied in bulk to a knowledgeable user.").
208. See, e.g., Smith v. Walter C. Best, Inc., 927 F.2d 736, 740 (3d Cir. 1990)
(sophisticated user doctrine); Kalinowski v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 851 F. Supp.
149, 157 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (sophisticated user doctrine); Newson v. Monsanto Co., 869 F.
Supp. 1255, 1259-60 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (sophisticated user doctrine); Forest, 791 F. Supp.
at 1465 (bulk supplier doctrine); Hall v. Ashland Oil Co., 625 F. Supp. 1515, 1520 (D.
Conn. 1986) (knowledgeable user doctrine); Menna v. Johns-Manville Corp., 585 F. Supp.
1178, 1184 (D.N.J. 1984), aft'd, 772 F.2d 895 (3d Cir. 1985) (sophisticated user doctrine);
In re Asbestos Litig. (Mergenthaler), 542 A.2d 1205, 1208 (Del. Super. 1986) ("sophisticat-
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while other courts have relied on an explicit bulk supplier doctrine ratio-
nale.209 This so-called "bulk supplier doctrine," however, appears to
be nothing more than a specialized version of the sophisticated user
doctrine. In any event, most bulk product cases are decided on the
basis of either a duty analysis or a balancing of factors approach.
Most bulk product cases involve: (1) raw materials which are to
be used in the production of finished products; (2) raw materials which
have already been processed into finished products; or (3) products that
are sold in bulk to employers for use in the workplace.1 °
i. Raw Materials to Be Used in the Production of Finished
Products
A number of cases have been brought by employees against
suppliers of raw materials that their employers have purchased for
processing into finished products.21 1 Although a few courts have
ed purchaser" doctrine); Hammond v. North Am. Asbestos Corp., 454 N.E.2d 210, 217-18
(Ill. 1983); Kennedy v. Mobay Corp., 579 A.2d 1191, 1206 (Md. Ct. App. 1990)
(sophisticated user doctrine); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Ralph Wilson Plastics Co., 509
N.W.2d 520, 523 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (sophisticated user doctrine); Todalen v. United
States Chem. Co., 424 N.W.2d 73, 79 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (knowledgeable user doctrine);
Phillips v. A.P. Green Refractories Co., 630 A.2d 874, 883 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (referring
to a "knowledgeable employer"); Munoz v. Gulf Oil Corp., 732 S.W.2d 62, 66 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1987) (referring to a "sophisticated commercial buyer").
209. See, e.g., Donahue v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 866 F.2d 1008, 1012 (8th Cir.
1989); Ditto v. Monsanto Co., 867 F. Supp. 585, 592 (N.D. Ohio 1993); Veil v. Vitek, Inc.,
803 F. Supp. 229, 234-35 (D.N.D. 1992); Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 739 F. Supp.
328, 331 (E.D. Tex. 1990); Cohen, 737 F. Supp. at 9; Higgins, 671 F. Supp. at 1059; Rivers
v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 554 N.Y.S.2d 401, 403 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990); House v.
Armour of Am., Inc., 886 P.2d 542, 554 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
210. Another group of decisions involve bulk products, such as propane gas or
chemicals, that are repackaged, but not otherwise changed by distributors for eventual sale
to retail consumers. In such cases, many courts have not excused the suppliers of such
products from the duty to warn anyone but their immediate purchasers. See, e.g., Manning
v. Ashland Oil Co., 721 F.2d 192, 195 (7th Cir. 1983); Nigh v. Dow Chemical Co., 634 F.
Supp. 1513, 1517 (W.D. Wis. 1986); Purvis v. PPG Indus., 502 So. 2d 714, 722 (Ala.
1987); Shell Oil Co. v. Harrison, 425 So. 2d 67, 70 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Exxon Corp.
v. Jones, 433 S.E.2d 350, 353 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993); Jones v. Hittle Service, Inc., 549 P.2d
1383, 1394 (Kan. 1976); Munoz, 732 S.W.2d 62 at 66. However, a substantial number have
required bulk suppliers to ensure that their intermediaries will disclose all of the information
they receive to their customers. See Stuckey v. Northern Propane Gas Co., 874 F.2d 1563,
1569 (11th Cir. 1989); Donahue, 866 F.2d at 1012; Bryant v. Technical Research Co., 654
F.2d 1337, 1345 (9th Cir. 1981); Venus v. O'Hara, 468 N.E.2d 405, 409 (Ill. Ct. App.
1984); Zamora v. Mobil Oil Corp., 704 P.2d 584 (Wash. 1985).
211. See, e.g., Smith, 927 F.2d at 736 (sand used in the production of metal products);
Whitehead v. St. Joe Lead Co., 729 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1984) (pig iron used in the production
of metal products); Newson, 869 F. Supp. at 1255 (polyvinyl butyryl "PVB" used in the
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invoked a duty-oriented rule to relieve bulk suppliers of their duty to
warn,212 the majority have employed the Restatement's balancing of
factors approach.2 3 However, even courts that purport to balance
factors have not been reluctant to grant summary judgments for bulk
product suppliers in some cases. 4  Smith v. Walter Best, Inc."'
exemplifies this approach. In Smith, a foundry worker brought suit
against various bulk suppliers of sand, claiming that they failed to warn
him about the danger of contracting silicosis from inhaling silica dust
contained in the sand.21 6 After weighing the factors set forth in
comment n, the trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary
judgment.217 On appeal, the circuit court concluded that the defen-
dants rightly relied on the plaintiff's employer to protect its workers
against the dangers of silicosis. 218
It should be noted that some courts have required suppliers of
inherently dangerous raw materials like asbestos to provide direct
warnings to workers. 2 9  Adkins v. GAF Corp. is illustrative of this
approach.2 Adkins involved a suit against asbestos suppliers by an
employee of a building products manufacturer who contracted asbestosis
manufacture of automobile windshields); Goodbar v. Whitehead Bros., 591 F. Supp. 552
(W.D. Va. 1984), affd sub nom. Bearle v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213 (4th Cir. 1985) (sand used
in steel foundry); Menna, 585 F. Supp. at 1178, (asbestos fibers used in the production of
insulation products); Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Pa. 1982),
affid sub nom. Van Buskirk v. Carey Canadian Mines, 760 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1985)
(asbestos fibers used in the production of insulation products); Hammond, 454 N.E.2d at 210
(asbestos fibers used in the production of insulation products); A.P. Green Refractories Co.,
630 A.2d at 874 (sand used in production of metal products).
212. See, e.g., York v. Union Carbide Co., 586 N.E.2d 861, 872 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
213. See, e.g., Smith, 927 F.2d at 740; Adams v. Union Carbide Corp., 737 F.2d 1453,
1457 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984); Newson, 869 F. Supp. at 1259;
Goodbar, 591 F. Supp. at 557; Kennedy, 579 A.2d at 1195-96; Whitehead v. Dycho Co.,
775 S.W.2d 593, 598 (Tenn. 1989).
214. See Smith v. Walter C. Best, Inc., 927 F.2d 736, 738; Adams, 737 F.2d at 1457;
Newson v. Monsanto Co., 869 F. Supp. 1255, 1265 (E.D. Mich. 1994); Goodbar, 591 F.
Supp. at 567-68. F.2d 213 (4th Cir. 1985).
215. 927 F.2d 736 (3d Cir. 1990).
216. Id. at 737-38.
217. Id. at 738.
218. Id. at 741.
219. See Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357, 368 (E.D. Pa. 1982),
affid sub nom. Van Buskirk v. Carey Canadian Mines, 760 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1985) ("[A]
manufacturer of an inherently dangerous product has a nondelegable duty to provide
warnings to the ultimate consumer or user."); Hammond v. North Am. Asbestos Corp., 454
N.E.2d 210, 218 (Ill. 1983) ("Given the facts of this case, defendants could not expect or
rely on others to make its products safe.").
220. 923 F.2d 1225 (6th Cir. 1991).
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as the result of exposure to processed raw asbestos fibers during the
course of his employment. 22' The defendant had packaged the asbestos
in burlap or paper bags which carried no warning about the dangerous
nature of the product. 22 The lower court held in favor of the employ-
ee.223  On appeal, the federal circuit court rejected the supplier's
argument that the sophisticated user doctrine excused it from a duty to
warn the employee.224 According to the court, since the supplier was
aware of health problems at the employee's plant, it could not reason-
ably rely on the employer to warn employees of the dangers of
asbestosis.225
ii. Raw Materials that Have Been Processed into Finished
Goods
A number of bulk product cases involve raw materials that have
been converted by the purchaser into finished products. Frequently, the
injured parties are workers who have used or been exposed to the
finished products during the course of their employment.2 26  Most
courts have concluded that bulk suppliers owe no duty to warn users of
finished products. 27  For example, in House v. Armour of America,
the widow of a slain police officer brought suit against the supplier of
KELVAR fibers which had been used in bullet-resistant vests.2 28 The
plaintiff claimed that the defendant should have warned users that the
vest would not protect them against rifle fire. 2 29 However, the court
221. Id. at 1227-28.
222. Id. at 1229.
223. See Adkins v. GAF Corp., 706 F. Supp. 559 (S.D. Ohio 1988).
224. Adkins, 923 F.2d at 1229-30.
225. Id. at 1231.
226. See, e.g., Ditto v. Monsanto Co., 867 F. Supp. 585 (N.D. Ohio 1993) (suit by
employees of electric transformer servicing company against bulk supplier of dielectric
insulating fluids containing PCBs); Higgins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 671 F. Supp.
1055 (D. Md. 1987), aff'd, 863 F.2d 1162 (4th Cir. 1988) (suit by firefighters against
supplier of ingredients used in paint at workplace); Rivers v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 554
N.Y.S.2d 401 (Sup. Ct. 1990) (claim against bulk supplier of Dimethylformamide used to
make capacitor which was installed in dictaphone at plaintiff's workplace). See also Sara
Lee Corp. v. Homasote Co., 719 F. Supp. 417, 422 (D. Md. 1989) (suit by owner of pickle
processing plant against supplier of ceiling material installed by building contractor).
227. See Anguiano v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 808 F. Supp. 719,726 (D. Ariz.
1992); Veil v. Vitek, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 229, 237 (D.N.D. 1992); Higgins, 671 F. Supp. at
1061; Rivers, 554 M4.Y.S.2d at 405; House v. Armour of Am., 886 P.2d 542, 554 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994).
228. 886 P.2d 542, 545-47 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
229. Id. at 550.
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concluded that since the defendant, as a bulk supplier, had no realistic
opportunity to provide a warning to the end users of its product, it had
no duty to do SO.
2 30
A few courts have eschewed the duty approach and have elected
to employ a balancing of factors approach. 23' However, with the
exception of Cimino v. Raymark Industries, Inc.,232 these courts have
also found in favor of the suppliers.233 In Cimino, workers who were
exposed to asbestos material in the production of insulation products
sought damages from a supplier of raw asbestos.2 34  The supplier
attempted to avoid liability by claiming that it had warned the plaintiffs'
employer of the risk.235 The court, however, concluded that under
Texas law, a bulk supplier could not discharge its duty to warn merely
by informing its immediate purchaser of the product's dangers.236
Rather, the bulk supplier was required to determine whether the
intermediary was capable of passing the warning on to the ultimate
consumers. 237  In this case, the court allowed the jury to consider
whether the defendant's reliance on its immediate purchasers was
reasonable and the jury found that it was not.238
While most bulk product cases have involved employment-related
injuries, the sophisticated user doctrine may also be invoked to defeat
failure-to-warn claims brought by retail consumers of the finished
product.2 39 Recently, a number of lawsuits have been brought by
recipients of medical implants made out of Teflon material supplied to
230. Id. at 554 ('Thus, DuPont had no duty nor opportunity to warn the ultimate vest
user about the protection afforded by vests woven from KELVAR.").
231. See In re TMJ Implants Prod. Liab. Litig., 872 F. Supp. at 1028-29; Ditto, 867
F. Supp. at 591; Sara Lee Corp., 719 F. Supp. at 428.
232. 739 F. Supp. 328 (E.D. Tex. 1990).
233. See In re TMJ Implants, 872 F. Supp. at 1021; Ditto, 867 F. Supp. at 586-87;
Sara Lee Corp., 719 F. Supp. at 428.
234. Cimino, 739 F. Supp. at 329.
235. Id. at 331.
236. Id. ("However, the mere presence of an intermediary does not excuse the
manufacturer from warning those whom it should reasonably expect to be endangered by
the use of its products.") (quoting Aim v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 717 S.W.2d 588, 591
(Tex. 1986)).
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. See White v. Weiner, 562 A.2d 378, 385 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (holding that a
bulk supplier of protamine sulfate has no duty to warn ultimate consumers of drugs with this
chemical as an ingredient).
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various manufacturers by DuPont.24  The plaintiffs in these cases
have alleged that DuPont failed to warn them that Teflon was not
suitable for use in implants. However, almost without exception, the
courts have ruled that DuPont had no duty to warn the ultimate users of
its product.24" '
Forest v. E.L DuPont de Nemours & Co. is one of the rare
exceptions to this trend.242 In Forest, a "Proplast TMJ Implant" was
implanted in the plaintiff's jaw to correct defects in her temporomandib-
ular joint.243  The implant material was made from
polytetrafluoroethylene ("PTFE") resins and fibers, along with other
ingredients.2 4 Although the implant was approved for sale by the
Food and Drug Administration, it caused severe injuries to the plaintiff
and many other implant recipients.245 The plaintiff brought suit
against DuPont, which supplied raw PTFE to the implant manufactur-
er.246 In a motion for summary judgment, Dupont argued that since
it warned the manufacturer that PTFE might not be suitable for use in
TMJ implants, it had discharged its duty to warn and was not required
to communicate directly with implant recipients such as the plain-
tiff.
247
240. See La Montagne v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 41 F.3d 846 (2d Cir. 1994);
Apperson v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 41 F.3d 1103 (7th Cir. 1994); Rynders v. E.I.
DuPont de Nemour; & Co., 21 F.3d 835 (8th Cir. 1994); Klem v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours
& Co., 19 F.3d 997 (5th Cir. 1994); In re TMJ Implants Prod. Liab. Litig., 872 F. Supp.
1019 (D. Minn. 1995); Kalinowski v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 851 F. Supp. 149
(E D. Pa. 1994); Kealoha v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 844 F. Supp. 590 (D. Haw.
1994); Hegna v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 825 F. Supp. 880 (D. Minn. 1993), aff'd,
27 F.3d 571 (8th Cir. 1994); Nowak v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 827 F. Supp. 1334
(W.D. Mich. 1993); Miller v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 811 F. Supp. 1286 (E.D.
Tenn. 1992); Anguiano v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 808 F. Supp. 719 (D. Ariz.
1992); Veil v. Vitek, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 229 (D.N.D. 1992); Forest v. E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 791 F. Supp. 1460 (D. Nev. 1992); Bond v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours &
Co., 868 P.2d 1114 (Colo. C1. App. 1993); Longo v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 632
So. 2d 1193 (La. C-. App. 1994).
241. See La Montagne, 41 F.3d at 856-58; Apperson, 41 F.3d at 1108; Rynders, 21
F.2d at 842; Klem, 19 F.3d at 1002-03; In re TMJ Implants, 872 F. Supp. at 1028-33;
Kealoha, 844 F. Supp. at 594-95; Nowak, 827 F. Supp. at 1334; Hegna, 825 F. Supp. at
884; Miller, 811 F. Supp. at 1292; Anguiano, 808 F. Supp. at 719; Veil, 803 F. Supp. at
234-35; Bond, 868 P.2d at 1118; Longo, 632 So. 2d at 1197.
242. 791 F. Supp. 1460 (D. Nev. 1992).
243. Id. at 1461.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 1461-62.
247. Forest, 7'91 F. Supp at 1462.
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The court acknowledged that some form of protection for bulk
suppliers was necessary to avoid unnecessary duplication when
manufacturers and retail marketers were already required to provide
warnings about product-related risks to their customers. 2" However,
the court declared that a bulk supplier should be required to verify that
its immediate purchaser was aware of the raw material's inherent risks
and that it planned to warn the ultimate user of such risks.249 Accord-
ing to the court:
Thus, the relevant question in bulk supplier cases is whether the bulk
supplier was objectively reasonable in relying on a knowledgeable
intermediary to provide a warning to the ultimate user. This
involves proof of two elements: 1) that the bulk supplier was
reasonable in believing that the intermediary knew of the dangers
associated with the bulk product, and 2) that the bulk supplier was
reasonable in relying on the intermediary to warn the ultimate user
of such danger. °
Since the know*ledge and reliability of the implant manufacturer were
essentially factual issues, the court concluded that it was inappropriate
to grant the defendant's motion for a summary judgment.2 5'
iii. Products Purchased for Use or Consumption in the
Workplace
Another group of cases involve products sold in bulk to an
employer for use in connection with cleaning or maintenance operations
in the plant. 2 A number of courts have concluded that suppliers of
248. Id. at 1465.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 1466.
251. Id. at 1469 ('The issues associated with the bulk supplier doctrine make summary
judgment on any record highly questionable.").
252. See Mason v. Texaco, Inc., 862 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1988) (products liability suit
by widow of Coast Guard instructor who allegedly died of leukemia as the result of job-
related exposure to benzene); Dougherty v. Hooker Chem. Co., 540 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1976)
(wrongful death action by widow of worker killed by inhalation of chemical solvent at
aircraft manufacturing plant); Cohen v. Steve's Ice Cream, 737 F. Supp. 8 (D. Mass. 1990)
(personal injury action by worker at ice cream plant injured by fire caused by leakage of
flammable liquid stored on plant premises); Hall v. Ashland Oil Co., 625 F. Supp. 1515 (D.
Conn. 1986) (wrongful death action by widow of worker who allegedly died of leukemia
due to exposure of benzene in the workplace); Werckenthein v. Bucher Petrochemical Co.,
618 N.E.2d 902 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (suit by chemist who contracted cancer as the result of
exposure to chemicals during the course of employment); Mascarenas v. Union Carbide
Corp., 492 N.W.2d 512 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (products liability action by bricklayer for
injuries caused by exposure to chemical solvent), Todalen v. United States Chem. Co., 424
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bulk products have little or no duty to warn employees of their
vendees 3  Cohen v. Steve' Ice Cream is illustrative of this reason-
ing. The plaintiff in Cohen was injured when flammable liquid
leaked from its container and caught fire. 5 The defendant supplied
the liquid to the plaintiff's employer in fifty-five gallon drums; however,
the employer transferred the liquid into smaller containers for use in the
workplace. 6 Although the defendant placed warnings on the original
containers, apparently these warnings were not passed on to the plaintiff
by his employer.2 57 The plaintiff argued that the supplier owed a duty
to warn him directly258  However, the court concluded that the bulk
product supplier satisfied its duty to warn by providing safety informa-
tion to its immediate vendee, the plaintiff's employer. 9
However, a few courts have employed a balancing of factors
analysis. 26 While this approach has allowed more cases to reach the
jury, the results have not always been favorable to plaintiffs.26' In
Dougherty v. Hooker Chemical Co., however, the balancing of factors
analysis greatly aided the plaintiff's case.262 In Dougherty, the widow
of an aircraft manufacturer employee brought suit against the supplier
of trichlorothylene ("TRI"), a chemical solvent.2 63  The plaintiff
alleged that her husband died as a result of exposure to TRI, which had
been used to clean helicopter transmissions. 264  The defendant sup-
plied TRI to the decedent's employer in fifty-five gallon drums.265
N.W.2d 73 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (subrogation action by employer against bulk supplier
for injuries to employee who was burned by sodium hydroxide while cleaning drain at
workplace); Whitehead v. Dycho Co., 775 S.W.2d 593 (Tenn. 1989) (action by employee
injured by explosion caused by the chemical naphtha supplied to employer by defendant);
Reed v. Pennwalt Corp., 591 P.2d 478 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (suit by employee of food
processing plant injured by contact with caustic soda used to remove potato peels from
machinery).
253. See Mason, 862 F.2d at 250; Cohen, 737 F. Supp. at 9; Werckenthein, 618 N.E.2d
at 909; Mascarenas 492 N.W.2d at 516.
254. 737 F. Supp. 8 (D. Mass. 1990).
255. Id. at 8.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 8-9.
258. Id. at 9.
259. Cohen, 737 F. Supp. at 9.
260. See Dougherty v. Hooker Chem. Co., 540 F.2d 174, 178-79 (3d Cir. 1976);
Whitehead v. Dycho Co., 775 S.W.2d 593, 598 (Tenn. 1989).
261. See Reed v. Pennwalt Corp., 591 P.2d 478, 482 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979).
262. 540 F.2d 174, 179 (3d Cir. 1976).
263. Id. at 175-76.
264. Id. at 176.
265. Id.
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Warning labels affixed to these containers cautioned against exposure
to TRI vapors, but did not mention that such exposure could cause
death.266  The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant.267
However, on appeal, a federal circuit court concluded that the jury, after
balancing the factors enumerated in comment n, had the right to decide
whether the defendant could have reasonably relied upon the victim's
employer to warn its employees that exposure to TRI could be fatal.26
III. FORMULATING A GENERAL RULE ON WARNING THROUGH
INTERMEDIARIES
There are two basic doctrines that permit product suppliers to rely
upon intermediaries to transmit safety information to end users. One
doctrine is the learned intermediary rule, which has traditionally been
limited to pharmaceutical products. The other doctrine is the sophisti-
cated user doctrine. In addition, some courts purport to apply separate
doctrines to suppliers of component parts and bulk products. However,
regardless of which doctrine is applied, courts tend to resolve duty to
warn cases by using either a duty-oriented analysis or a balancing test.
The learned intermediary rule and the duty version of the sophisticated
user doctrine are illustrative of the first approach. These are essentially
bright line rules which protect parties against liability as long as they
behave in a certain way. The balancing of factors branch of the
sophisticated user doctrine, and its counterparts in component part and
bulk products cases, is more open-textured, leaving it up to the jury to
decide whether a defendant's reliance on an intermediary is legally
sufficient or not.
Each of these approaches has its strengths and weaknesses. The
duty-oriented analysis is relatively predictable-a desirable characteristic
because it provides some assurance to producers and suppliers that their
communication structures will pass muster in the courts. However, like
most per se rules, the duty approach sometimes sacrifices fairness for
administrative efficiency. The balancing approach, on the other hand,
is more equitable in nature, but is less certain in its application, than the
duty-oriented approach. This uncertainty makes it difficult for parties
266. Id. at 180.
267. Dougherty, 540 F.2d at 178.
268. Id. at 182 ("[I]t is the jury's function to determine, after balancing the § 388
considerations to which we have referred, whether Boeing's knowledge, if any, could have
relieved Hooker from any requirement to warn Boeing's employees and thus, from any
liability.").
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to predict when they may safely rely upon intermediaries to convey
safety information to users or consumers.
In this part of the article, two issues will be considered. First, is
it possible to formulate a general rule that is broad enough to cover all
of the situations discussed in part II? Second, should this rule be duty-
oriented or should it require the decisionmaker to balance various
factors in order to determine liability?
A. Common Issues
At first blush, the relationships between the producers, intermediar-
ies, and product users that we examined so far seem to be quite
different. For example, where pharmaceuticals are involved, the
producer is a product manufacturer, the intermediary is a physician, and
the end user is the intermediary's patient. In the case of industrial
machinery, the producer is a product manufacturer, the intermediary is
an employer, and the end user is an employee of the intermediary.
Where component parts are concerned, the producer is a component part
supplier, the intermediary is a manufacturer of a finished product, and
the end user is usually an employee of the purchaser of the finished
product. Various relationships are also involved with bulk products.
For example, in the case of raw materials prior to processing, the
producer is a supplier of raw materials, the intermediary is an employer,
and the end user is an employee of the intermediary. However, where
raw materials have been incorporated into a finished product, the
producer is a bulk product supplier, the intermediary is the manufacturer
of a finished product, and the end user is usually an employee of the
finished product's purchaser. Finally, where bulk products are
purchased for use or consumption in the workplace, the producer is a
bulk product supplier, the intermediary is an employer, and the end user
is an employee of the intermediary.
Notwithstanding the fact that different relationships may exist
among the various parties, there is a certain amount of commonality
among these various fact patterns. For example, in each case, there is
no direct contact between the original producer and the end user of the
product. Moreover, some characteristic of the product, the way it is
used, or the way it is packaged, makes its difficult for the original
producer to communicate effectively with end users. Finally, the
intermediary usually has an independent legal duty to warn end users of
the product. These common threads suggest that it may be possible to
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formulate a general rule that is broad enough to cover most duty to
warn situations.
B. Duty-Oriented Rules Versus Balancing Approaches
A general rule can incorporate a duty-oriented analysis or a
balancing test. The discussion below will attempt to evaluate these
approaches in terms of such policy goals as accident cost avoidance,
minimization of administrative costs, and compensation of accident
victims.
1. Accident Cost Avoidance
One of the most important goals of products liability law is to
"deter" product-related accidents. This does not mean that accidents
must be prevented at all costs; rather, the objective is to minimize the
sum of accident costs and accident-prevention costs. 269  Accident
costs, in this context, include personal injuries, property damage, and
direct pecuniary losses. Accident cost avoidance costs include
expenditures for better product quality, safer product design, as well as
the generation and transmission of product safety information to users
and consumers.
a. Disclosure of Safety Information as an Accident Cost
Avoidance Strategy
The disclosure of safety information, such as instructions or
warnings, can be an effective accident cost avoidance strategy.
27 0
269. See Jennifer H. Arlen, Compensation Systems and Efficient Deterrence, 52 MD.
L. REv. 1093, 1096 (1993) ("Under economic theory, the optimal level of risk for any
particular activity is the level at which the total social cost of accidents is minimized-that
is, the level that minimizes the cost of reducing (or eliminating) the risk in question, plus
the expected cost to the members of society of the resulting injuries."); Jon D. Hanson &
Kyle D. Logue, The First-Party Insurance Externality: An Economic Justification for
Enterprise Liability, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 129, 160 (1990) ('The deterrence goal of
products liability law is to minimize the costs of product accidents, including the costs of
preventing accidents.").
270. Warnings and instructions are by no means foolproof. Product users may fail to
notice or read otherwise adequate warnings for the following reasons: (1) functional
illiteracy; (2) inclusion within predictively inattentive or incompetent user groups; (3)
misplaced or unavailable safety information; (4) failure of intermediaries to pass on
warnings to end users; (5) reliance by consumers on general knowledge or experience; (6)
information overload; and (7) competing demands on time and attention. See generally
Howard Latin, "Good" Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA L.
REv. 1193, 1207-20 (1994). Even those who do read and understand warnings may fail to
heed them because of: (1) imperfect memory; (2) overconfidence; (3) reflexive actions
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Potential users who are informed about a product's inherent risks can
choose less risky substitutes for the product2 7' or take appropriate
precautions if they do use the product.
272
In order to be efficient, however, the benefits of accident cost
avoidance measures must exceed their costs. 273  When accident costs
or accident avoidance costs are not known, it has been suggested that
liability be imposed on the party who "is in the best position to make
the cost-benefit analysis between accident costs and accident avoidance
costs and to act on that decision once it is made. ' 274  Ordinarily,
product manufacturers are considered to be the cheapest cost avoiders
where manufacturing flaws or design defects are concerned because they
have control over the ultimate manufacture and design of their
products. 275  However, this principle does not necessarily apply to
safety information, particularly if we distinguish between the generation
of safety information and its communication to product users.
Sometimes one party may be in a better position to detect product-
related risks in the first instance, while another party may be able to
communicate more cheaply with product end users. In such cases, the
first party would be the cheapest cost avoider with respect to the
generation of safety information, but the second party would be the
during emergencies; (4) disregard of low probability risks; and (5) skepticism about
manufacturer credibilty. Id. at 1242-48. This suggests that, in some cases at least,
improved product design may be a more effective accident-cost-reduction strategy than
reliance on warnings. See A.D. Twerski et al., The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Products
Liability-Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 495, 509 (1976).
271. See W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a Proper Role for Hazard Warnings in Products
Liability Cases, 13 J. PROD. LIAB. 139, 141 (1991).
272. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products
Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 285 (1992);
Michael A. Pittenger, Note, Reformulating the Strict Liability Failure to Warn, 49 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1509, 1533 (1992).
273. In the case of warnings, one such cost would be the expense of obtaining
information about the nature and magnitude of product-related risks. This sort of data is
usually generated through pre-market testing and research. However, in some cases,
additional information may be acquired by post-market assessments of product performance.
Once product safety information has been obtained, additional costs must be incurred in
order to communicate this information to users or consumers of the product.
274. See Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in
Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1060 (1972).
275. See David G. Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33
VAND. L. REV. 681, 71 (1980) ("Manufacturers today, especially those of products that are
technologically complex, often are in a far better position than consumers to discover,
evaluate, and act upon, dangers that inhere in the products that they make and sell.").
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cheapest cost avoider insofar as communication costs were con-
cerned. 76
i. The Generation of Product Safety Information
Ordinarily, manufacturers or producers are in the best position to
generate safety information about their products.277 Not only are
manufacturers familiar with the general characteristics of their products,
but they have the ability to identify new safety risks by pre-market
product testing or by post-market analysis of product performance
data.278 In contrast, wholesalers, retailers, and others in the distribu-
tive chain seldom have the resources or the expertise to acquire new
product safety information on their own. Users and consumers have
even less ability to obtain such information. 7 9
ii. The Communication of Product Safety Information
When it comes to the communication of product safety information,
the product manufacturer will often be the cheapest cost avoider as
well.280  For example, if the product in question reaches the ultimate
user or consumer in its original packaging, the manufacturer can easily
convey warnings and instructions by means of labels or package inserts.
On the other hand, the original manufacturer may not be able to convey
information effectively to end users when the product undergoes further
276. See Richard D. Cunningham, Comment, Apportionment Between Partmakers and
Assemblers in Strict Liability, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 544, 553 (1982).
277. See Marshall S. Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection, 60
VA. L. REV. 1109, 1289 (1974) (producers often possess information about the safety of
their products that is not available to consumers).
278. See Stephen M. Bressler, Note, The Warning Claim in an Arizona Products
Liability Action: Limitations on the Duty to Warn, 25 ARz. L. REV. 395, 395-96 (1983)
(only the manufacturer is in a position to inspect the product or discover risks).
279. See Bernard W. Bell, Note, The Manufacturer's Duty to Notify of Subsequent
Safety Improvements, 33 STAN. L. REV. 1087, 1090 (1981). Although purchasers and
product users might be willing to pay for safety information, free-rider problems and other
transaction costs would make it almost impossible for such an information market to operate
successfully. See Susan D. Carle, A Hazardous Mix: Discretion to Disclose and Incentives
to Suppress Under OSHA's Hazard Communication Standard, 97 YALE L.J. 581, 587
(1988).
280. See Michael D. Green, When Toxic Worlds Collide: Regulatory and Common
Law Prescriptions for Risk Communication, 13 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 209, 223 (1989)
("Because the cost of providing a warning or other information is generally quite low...
the tendency is to require more rather than less in the way of information communication.");
Bressler, supra note 278, at 396 ("In the warning cases, the cost of the warning is usually
so minimal that the balance almost always weighs in favor of an obligation to warn.").
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processing or assembly or when it is used in an industrial setting. In
such cases, someone else in the distributive chain may be the cheapest
cost avoider.28'
b. Searching for the "Cheapest Cost Avoiders"
The foregoing discussion suggests that it is useful, when searching
for the cheapest cost avoider, to distinguish between the generation of
safety information and the communication of such information to end
users. The party who can generate safety information most cheaply may
not necessarily be the one who can most efficiently convey it to end
users. This can be seen more clearly by an examination of various
product distribution scenarios.
i. Pharmaceutical Products
Both drug manufacturers and prescribing physicians are potential
accident cost avoiders when it comes to obtaining and communicating
information about the risks of pharmaceutical products. As far as the
generation of basic research on product safety is concerned, pharmaceu-
tical manufacturers are clearly the cheapest cost avoiders. Not only do
drug manufacturers have superior resources to devote to research, but
they are already required to conduct a thorough investigation of product-
related risks in order to secure pre-marketing approval from the Food
and Drug Administration.8 2 In contrast, physicians have neither the
resources nor the expertise to conduct basic research on the biochemical
properties of the pharmaceutical products that they prescribe. Further-
more, such research would be a waste of time and money because it
would duplicate the efforts of drug companies.
On the other hand, when it comes to the communication of product
safety information, both product manufacturers and prescribing
physicians are good accident cost avoiders. Both manufacturers and
physicians have the ability to transmit safety information to patients:
manufacturers can communicate with patients by means of package
inserts, while physicians can do so through face-to-face contact with
their patients.
281. See Richard 0. Faulk, Products Liability and the Chemical Manufacturer:
Limitations on the Duty to Warn, 38 OKLA. L. REV. 233, 240 (1985).
282. See generady Jeffrey N. Gibbs & Bruce F. Mackler, Food and Drug Administra-
tion Regulation and Product Liability: Strong Sword, Weak Shield, 22 TORT & INS. L.J.
194, 203-04 (1987) (describing the new drug approval process).
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ii. Products Designed for Industrial Use
The buyer of industrial machinery typically purchases it in order
to produce goods or services for retail consumption. This machinery
seldom poses any direct threat to retail consumers. However, employ-
ees of the purchaser may be endangered by industrial machinery and,
as such, are entitled to receive safety information. The cheapest cost
avoider may be the manufacturer of the industrial machinery or it may
be the purchaser/employer.
Manufacturers of the industrial machinery appear to be in the best
position to generate information about the safety of their products.
Unlike suppliers of component parts or bulk products, manufacturers of
industrial machinery usually have complete control over finished
products and can easily determine how they will perform in the
workplace.283 Any risks which are not detected by manufacturers prior
to marketing will quickly be brought to their attention by purchasers.
Accordingly, it is appropriate to impose a duty to generate safety
information on the manufacturers of such products.
On the other hand, the purchaser/employers seem to have the
advantage when it comes to communicating product safety information
to their employees. 4 To be sure, manufacturers can attach warning
labels to the machinery they sell and may be able in some cases to
provide other safety instructions as well. However, safety literature that
is furnished to the purchaser may never reach the workers who are
actually endangered by the product. In contrast, employers can see that
safety literature provided by manufacturers actually reaches their
employees. In addition, employers can improve the safety of the work
environment by providing supervision and training for their employ-
ees.28 5  Thus, where industrial machinery is concerned, employers
appear to be more efficient cost avoiders than manufacturers. 86
283. Manufacturers who provide multipurpose machines that undergo further
modifications to meet the specific needs of the purchaser do not have this sort of control.
However, these producers are usually treated as component part suppliers rather than
vendors of finished products.
284. See Faulk, supra note 281, at 240.
285. See Schwartz & Driver, supra note 9, at 43.
286. Schwartz & Driver, supra note 9, at 79.
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iii. Component Parts
Where mechanical component parts are incorporated into another
product by the purchaser, the cheapest cost avoider is likely to be either
the component part supplier or the manufacturer of the finished product.
As far as the generation of safety information is concerned, the supplier
of the component part may be in the best position to discover the risk
if it is an inherent one which exists at the time that the component part
leaves the supplier's control.8 7
However, when it comes to the communication of a known risk, the
manufacturer of the finished product is likely to be the cheapest cost
avoider. The only way that a component part supplier can warn end
users is to attach a label to the component part. This method of
warning may be effective if the warning label remains visible after the
component part is incorporated into a finished product. However,
warning labels will not be visible, and therefore will not be effective,
if the component part is incorporated internally into a finished product
in such a way that it is not visible. Nor will the component parts
supplier be able to communicate with end users of the finished product
in some other way because it will not always know who they are. 8
On the other hand, the manufacturer can place warning labels on the
finished product and thus disclose safety information to end users. Even
if it is not feasible to place warning labels on the finished product, the
manufacturer will still be in a better position to convey safety informa-
tion to end users because it will be closer to them in the distributive
chain.
iv. Raw Materials and Bulk Products
Where products delivered in bulk form to the manufacturer of a
finished product, potential cheapest cost avoiders include the bulk
product supplier and the manufacturer of the finished product. If the
risk involved is an inherent one, the bulk product supplier is likely to
be the cheapest cost avoider insofar as the generation of safety
information is concerned. 9
287. However, when the risk arises because of something the manufacturer does to the
finished product, the manufacturer may be in a better position to discover the risk.
288. See Schwartz & Driver, supra note 9, at 42.
289. On the other hand, the manufacturer of the finished product will probably be the
cheapest cost avoider if the risk arises from the product's design.
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On the other hand, manufacturers of finished products are often
better able to communicate safety information about bulk products.29
When products are delivered to the manufacturer in containers, such as
fifty-five gallon drums, the supplier can place a warning on the
container. However, employees who use such products often do not see
or understand these warning labels. Furthermore, warnings labels
cannot be used at all when bulk products are delivered in tank cars,
dump trucks, or other large containers. 291 In contrast, manufacturers
of finished products do have some ability to warn users and consumers.
For example, when the bulk products are purchased as raw material for
incorporation into finished products, manufacturers of the finished
products can affix warning labels to their products or enclose safety
information with them. Likewise, when bulk products are purchased for
use in the workplace, purchasers can directly warn their employees
about product hazards and can instruct them on safe use of these
products.
c. Concerns about Reliability
If the party who can potentially communicate most cheaply with
end users is not likely to do so, it may be necessary to shift the duty to
warn to a more reliable party. Three factors negatively affect reliability:
first, a party may fail to convey safety information because it lacks an
adequate economic incentive to do so; second, even when a party is
sufficiently motivated, safety information may fail to reach the intended
recipients because the party cannot physically communicate with end
users of the product; third, even when safety information is actually
conveyed to end users, they may not be able to understand or act upon
the information provided.
In the case of pharmaceutical products, tort liability provides a
sufficient incentive for both manufacturer and physicians to convey
product information to product consumers. Manufacturers who fail to
disclose product-related risks are subject to liability under principles of
strict products liability,2" while physicians who do not communicate
safety information to their patients may be held liable under the doctrine
290. See Myron J. Bromberg, The Mischief of the Strict Liability Label in the Law of
Warnings, 17 SETON HALL L. REV. 526, 539 (1987).
291. See Cheney, supra note 88, at 596.
292. See James E. Britain, Product Honesty Is the Best Policy: A Comparison of
Doctors' and Manufacturers' Duty to Disclose Drug Risks and the Importance of Consumer
Expectations in Determining Product Defect, 79 Nw. U. L. REv. 342, 369 (1984).
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of informed consent. 93 However, the methods of communication
available to physicians appear to be more reliable than those available
to manufacturers: physicians can communicate directly with their
patients, while manufacturers must rely on package inserts.294 Finally,
patients are more likely to understand safety information that is
conveyed by means of face to face conversations with their physicians
than warnings that are transmitted by manufacturers in package
inserts.295
Where industrial machinery and related products are concerned, tort
liability provides an incentive for manufacturers to transmit safety
information to end users of their products.2 96 However, often there is
no completely reliable way for the manufacturer to transmit such
information. 97 Warning labels may not remain attached to industrial
machines throughout their useful life and safety literature may be lost
or destroyed. Moreover, written warnings are not nearly as effective as
formal instruction and training in product safety.298
This suggests that employers are usually superior accident cost
avoiders when it comes to workplace safety.2 9 Relying on information
from the manufacturer, as well as on their own experience with
workplace safety, employers can anticipate safety problems and take
affirmative steps to prevent accidents from occurring. However,
employers are not necessarily reliable accident cost avoiders, primarily
because workers compensation laws do not always provide sufficient
incentive to protect employee against accidents.3° Unlike others in the
distributive chain, an employer's liability is limited to the amount
specified in the state workers compensation statute. Economic
incentives are further diminished by the fact that workers compensation
293. See Styles, supra note 45, at 128.
294. See Cheney, supra note 88, at 583 ("Because the manufacturer does not sell the
packages directly to the consumer, the manufacturer cannot realistically ensure that warnings
are on the package in the unit-of-use containers that the consumer ultimately receives.").
295. See Flannagan, supra note 48, at 413.
296. See Cheney, supra note 88, at 566 (discussing manufacturers' duty to warn under
tort law).
297. See Schwartz & Driver, supra note 9, at 68 ("The manner in which industrial
products are marketed and distributed severely limits the manufacturer's ability to
communicate effective instructional warnings to the product user.").
298. Schwartz & Driver, supra note 9, at 79.
299. Schwartz & Driver, supra note 9, at 79.
300. Green, supra note 280, at 213; but see W. KIp ViSCuSi, REFORMING PRODUCrS
LIABILITY 11 (1991) (arguing that workers compensation programs do have some deterrent
effect on employers).
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awards are usually paid by insurance carriers rather than by employers
themselves."'
In the case of component parts, the choice is between the
component part supplier and the manufacturer of the finished product.
The threat of tort liability provides an incentive for both parties to
comply with their duty to warn. However, there may be no reliable way
for the component part manufacturer to reach end users if the compo-
nent part is not visible to users of the finished product. For this reason,
manufacturers of finished products seem to be more reliable than
component part suppliers.
The same is true of products that are sold in bulk. Where bulk
products are incorporated into finished goods, the prospect of tort
liability for failure to warn is sufficient to induce both bulk product
suppliers and manufacturers of finished products to provide safety
information to the ultimate users or consumers of the finished products.
However, manufacturers of finished products have control of the
finished product's packaging whereas component part suppliers do not.
Furthermore, manufacturers of finished products are closer than
component part suppliers to end users in the distributive chain.
Bulk products also expose workers to the risk of injury. This may
occur when hazardous raw materials are used in the manufacture of
finished products as well as when bulk products, such as solvents, are
used for cleaning and maintenance operations in the workplace. In
theory, the employer/purchaser is the cheapest cost avoider because of
its control over the work environment. However, as mentioned earlier,
workers compensation laws may discourage employers from investing
in workplace safety.
d. Accident Cost Avoidance and the General Rule
The above discussion indicates that while original producers are
best able to generate safety information, intermediaries, such as
physicians, employers, or manufacturers of finished products, can
usually communicate this information to end users more effectively and
more cheaply. If this is correct, the general rule should permit original
producers to rely upon intermediaries to transmit safety information." 2
Requiring original producers as well as intermediaries to warn end users
301. Since liability insurers base the size of premiums on the claims experience of
classes of employers, rather than on the experience of individual employers, insurance
premiums provide little incentive to employers either. See Cheney, supra note 88, at 579.
302. See Willner, supra note 89, at 594.
1234 [Vol. 46:1185
Learned Intermediaries
increases accident avoidance costs without achieving any significant
gain in accident cost reduction. This suggests that a duty-oriented rule
would be the better approach as far as accident cost avoidance is
concerned.
2. Minimization of Administrative Costs
Administrative costs refer to the costs of operating a particular
system of accident cost avoidance or compensation. These costs include
the expense various parties must incur in order to determine the extent
of their legal responsibilities. °3 They also include the legal expenses
incurred by plaintiffs, defendants and liability insurers to adjudicate
damage claims.3°4  A duty-oriented rule would entail far fewer
administrative costs than a balancing test.
a. Information Costs
Legal rules that are specific are less costly than rules that are vague
or open-ended. In the former case, parties can easily determine ex ante
what they must do to avoid liability. On the other hand, when legal
rules are uncertain, parties must spend more time and resources to
ascertain what is required for compliance. A duty-oriented rule has a
clear advantage here. Under such an approach, an original producer
will know in advance that it satisfy its duty to warn by conveying
product safety information to the appropriate intermediary. In contrast,
a balancing test will impose significant information costs on many of
the parties in the distributive chain. °5 For example, under the
Restatement's balancing of factors approach, the original producer
would have to determine whether the intermediary was likely to pass
safety information on to end users of the product. In theory, the
original producer might have to investigate the character and fitness of
more than one intermediary if there were several parties in the
distributive chain between the producer and the ultimate users or
consumers of the product.
Even if the original producer concludes that an intermediary is
reliable, it can never be entirely certain that it has satisfied its duty to
303. See Victor E. Schwartz & Liberty Mahshigian, A Permanent Solution for Product
Liability Crises: finiform Federal Law Standards, 64 DENV. U. L. REV. 685, 692 (1988).
304. See Steen Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 357, 363-64 (1984).
305. See Wil[ner, supra note 89, at 604.
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warn under a balancing test.3 6 Section 388, comment n declares that
direct warnings may still be required if the product is sufficiently
hazardous or if the expense of providing is not too burdensome. Of
course, there is no way for an original producer to know for sure how
a jury will decide these issues.
b. Litigation Costs
Whether one views the tort system as a regulatory regime or as a
compensation scheme, its administrative costs are enormous. ° 7 In
products liability cases, as in other tort actions, manufacturers or their
insurers must spend large amounts of money to investigate, defend, and
settle claims."' Plaintiffs also incur heavy costs if their claims are
contested. According to one study, more money is spent on products
liability litigation than is paid out to accident victims.3°9
Obviously, a legal rule that reduces litigation has an advantage over
one that encourages it. In this respect, a duty-oriented approach seems
preferable to a rule that requires a good deal of fact-finding. As
suggested earlier, if a duty-oriented rule is adopted, the liability standard
will be relatively clear ex ante. Thus, when injuries do occur, potential
claimants (and their lawyers) will be able to determine whether or not
potential defendants have satisfied their duty to warn. This will
discourage plaintiffs from litigating frivolous claims and it will also give
the parties an incentive to settle meritorious ones.
Balancing tests, on the other hand, invite litigation. As mentioned
earlier, it is difficult under such tests for producers to know what they
must do in order to satisfy their legal responsibilities. This uncertainty
also presents problems after accidents occur. Because of the fact-
specific nature of balancing tests, duty to warn issues will rarely be
306. See Willner, supra note 89, at 604.
307. See JOHN. G. FLEMING, THE AMERICAN TORT PROCESS 18 (1988) ("The most
negative feature of the tort system is its staggering overhead cost."); Stephen D. Sugarman,
Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 558, 596 (1985) ("[]The tort system is
fabulously expensive to operate in comparison to modem compensation systems."); Gregory
C. Jackson, Note, Pharmaceutical Product Liability May Be Hazardous to Your Health, 42
AM. U. L. REV. 199, 233 (1992) ("Strict liability thus creates excessive administrative or
transaction costs in the form of litigation expenses.").
308. See John G. Fleming, Is There a Future for Tort?, 44 LA. L. REV. 1193, 1207
(1984) ("Compensation [under the tort system] is dependent on issues of causation and fault,
which require investigation and are frequently contested.").
309. See Michel A. Coccia, Uniform Products Liability Legislation: A Proposed
Federal Solution, 51 INS. COUNS. J. 104, 117 (1984) (only 47 cents of every dollar spent
by manufacturers on product liability claims is actually paid to victims).
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resolved by the trial judge pursuant to a motion for summary judgment.
Instead, liability can only be determined after a jury trial.3"' Prior to
trial, the parties can only guess at what a jury might conclude.
Although this sort of uncertainty might encourage settlement before
trial, it might also cause litigants, particularly plaintiffs, to gamble on
the possibility of a favorable jury verdict.
Another disadvantage of balancing approaches is that they
encourage multiparty litigation. For example, if A relies on B to warn
C and B fails to do so, A might be liable to C, along with B, if a court
concludes that A acted unreasonably in failing to warn C directly. In
such a case, C would have a claim against both A and B. This means
that either C will sue both A and B or, if C sues only one party, the
other will be brought into the lawsuit as a third-party defendant. Since
multiparty litigation is usually more expensive than traditional two-party
litigation, balancing approaches seem to be inconsistent with the goal of
reducing litigation costs.
3. Compensation of Accident Victims
Compensation of accident victims is one of the traditional goals of
tort law. Arguably, a general rule which relies on a balancing of factors
does a better job of compensating accident victims than a duty-oriented
approach. One reason is that balancing tests increase the chances that
a plaintiff will be able to recover from more than one party. Under a
duty-oriented analysis, once a producer warns the next party in the
distributive chain it will not be held liable for someone else's failure to
warn. This means that injured parties can normally look to only one
source for compensation in failure to warn cases. In contrast, the
balancing approach extends liability to parties farther down the
distributive chain without necessarily relieving parties who are farther
up the chain.
Ordinarily, when a case goes to trial, joint and several liability will
not have any effect on the size of the judgment since the jury will
apportion the award between the defendants. However, joint and several
liability favors plaintiffs, and thereby increase overall compensation to
accident victims, in two situations. The first is where one of the
defendants is insolvent or cannot be reached for suit. Assume that A
warns B, who Fails to warn C. Under a duty-oriented rule, C can only
sue B and if B is insolvent, C will recover nothing. In other words, the
310. See Willner, supra note 89, at 599.
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risk of insolvency falls on the victim. However, if A and B are jointly
and severally liable to C, then C can obtain a full recovery from A if B
is insolvent. Thus, the risk of B's insolvency falls on A and not on
C.
3 11
Joint and several liability also increases compensation for accident
victims in cases where one of the responsible parties is the plaintiff's
employer. Under a balancing approach, an injured employee who has
received a worker's compensation award may still be able to seek
additional compensation from other defendants if his or her employer
fails to communicate a warning.' 2 On the other hand, under a duty-
oriented rule, an injured employee is limited to a workers' compensation
award if a product seller warns the employer and the employer does not
warn the employee. Under the law of worker's compensation, the
"exclusive remedy" doctrine provides that the schedule of benefits set
forth in the worker's compensation statute is the sole and exclusive
remedy of an employee against an employer 14  To the extent that
worker's compensation awards are inadequate, 3 5 an approach which
allows victims to supplement their workers compensation awards by
suing nonemployers increases their overall level of compensation.
A balancing approach favors accident victims in another way. As
the discussion in part I demonstrates, when courts employ duty-oriented
rules, they tend to decide cases by summary judgment, a practice which
usually favors defendants. In contrast, when a balancing test is
employed, cases are more likely to be decided by juries. Given the fact
311. See Richard W. Wright, Allocating Liability Among Multiple Responsible Causes:
A Principled Defense of Joint and Several Liability for Actual Harm and Risk Exposure, 21
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1141, 1142-43 (1988).
312. See Cheney, supra note 88, at 577.
313. An employee would still be able to recover against a product supplier if the
supplier failed to provide an adequate warning and knowledge of the product's dangerous
characteristics was not imputed to the victim's employer.
314. See Robert S. L. Goggin & Thomas A. Brophy, Toxic Torts: Workable Defenses
Available to the Corporate Defendant, 28 VILL. L. REv. 1208, 1269 (1982-83); Nina G.
Stillman & John R. Wheeler, The Expansion of Occupational Health and Safety, 62 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 969, 971-72 (1987).
315. There is considerable disagreement about the adequacy of workers compensation
benefits. Compare Jerry J. Phillips, In Defense of the Tort System, 27 ARIz. L. REV. 603,
610-11 (1985) (claiming that payments for workplace injuries and industrial diseases are
woefully inadequate) with W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a Diminished Role for Joint Liability:
Social Insurance, Government Regulation, and Contemporary Risks to Health and Safety,
6 YALE J. ON REG. 65, 98 (1989) (arguing that workers compensation awards are fairly
generous).
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that juries tend to favor plaintiffs in personal injury cases, balancing
tests appear to benefit plaintiffs. 6
To summarize, a balancing test may be preferable to a duty-
oriented rule as far as compensation is concerned. This is because
plaintiffs may be able to sue more than one defendant under the former
approach and thus can recover even if one of the parties is insolvent.
The ability to sue multiple parties also allows workers to recover more
from product sellers than they could from their employers under
workers compensation. Finally, cases are more likely to be decided by
juries under a balancing approach, a result that usually benefits
plaintiffs.
4. A Final Evaluation
A duty-oriented rule allows parties to rely upon warning chains to
transmit product safety information to end users. This approach
achieves a high level of accident cost avoidance at relatively little cost.
Although a balancing test would be a bit more reliable, it would force
parties to duplicate their efforts to warn end users. Arguably, this
increased cost will outweigh any marginal gain in reliability that occur
from such duplication. A duty-oriented approach is also cheaper to
administer because it provides more certainty to the parties than an
open-ended balancing test. The only advantage of a balancing test is
that it potentially provides more compensation for accident victims. All
in all, a duty-oriented rule seems to be the better approach.
IV. A PROPOSED RULE
I would propose the following duty-oriented rule to govern the
communication of safety information between producers and suppliers
of products and end users of these products. The proposal does not
designate who has the duty to generate safety information. This
question is best decided under general duty to warn principles.
Although it is expressed in statutory form, many states might prefer to
implement the rule through common-law decisionmaking. In addition,
some states may prefer to retain the traditional learned intermediary rule
and limit the proposed rule to industrial products, component parts and
bulk products. The proposed general rule would provide as follows:
A product supplier who sells to another either: (1) pharmaceutical
products such as drugs, biologics and medical devices sold by
316. See Willner, supra note 89, at 599-600.
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prescription, (2) products intended for use or consumption in a
workplace or industrial setting, (3) nondefective component parts
intended for assembly or incorporation into more complex systems
or machines, or (4) materials in bulk form intended for further
processing into finished goods, shall not be held liable, either in
negligence or strict liability, for injuries to the ultimate users of these
products arising from the supplier's failure to warn such users,
provided that the supplier has furnished adequate safety information
about the product to its immediate vendee, or in the case of
pharmaceutical products to the prescribing physician. In addition, a
product supplier shall not be held liable for failing to warn the
ultimate user or consumer of the product if the ultimate user's
prescribing physician, the supplier's immediate vendee, or any other
party in the distributive chain is already aware of the dangerous
characteristics associated with the product or should be aware of
such risks.
The intent of this proposal is to provide producers and suppliers
with a clear statement of what they must do to avoid liability for failure
to warn end users of their products. For example, unlike some versions
of the sophisticated user doctrine, this proposal provides that a producer
or supplier is fully protected if it warns the appropriate intermediary
even though the intermediary fails to pass the information to others in
the distributive chain. In other words, the producer or supplier does not
have to worry about the reliability of an intermediary. There are two
reasons for excluding reliability as an issue: first, reliability is a factual
issue and this proposal is designed to eliminate as many factual issues
as possible in order to achieve more certainty for the parties and thus
reduce administrative costs. Consequently, the only issue of fact under
this proposed rule is the adequacy of the safety information actually
provided to the vendee.
The second reason for disregarding reliability is that it dilutes
responsibility for warning about product risks. Thus, if A conveys
safety information to B in order for B to transmit it to C, B should be
fully liable for any failure to commurlicate a warning to C. Holding A
liable in this situation reduces the incentive on B, the cheapest cost
avoider, to act responsibly. Warning chains are likely to work most
effectively if the duty to warn (and liability for failing to warn) is
shifted entirely from one party in the chain to the next until the warning
reaches the actual user or consumer of the product.
The proposal also relies on the concept of imputed knowledge to
limit liability. Even if it fails to warn its immediate vendee, a producer
or supplier can still defeat a failure to warn claim by proving that
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someone lower in the distributive chain is, or should be, knowledgeable
about the product's characteristics. This simply reflects the principle
that a warning would serve no purpose when given to someone who
already knows about the risk in question. However, it should be noted
that knowledge of the product is not imputed to ordinary retail
consumers or to workers who use or consume the product during the
course of their employment.
At first blush, the proposed rule may seem to favor producers and
suppliers over accident victims. However, it is fully consistent with the
policy considerations discussed earlier in part Il. From the perspective
of accident cost avoidance, the rule encourages parties in the distributive
chain to rely on warning chains in order to achieve accident cost
avoidance at the lowest possible cost. The proposed rule also concen-
trates liability on the cheapest cost avoider instead of diffusing it among
multiple parties. The proposed rule will also save administrative costs.
By giving producers and suppliers a clear idea of what they must do to
satisfy their duty to warn, the proposed rule will reduce information
costs. The certainty provided by the proposed rule will also discourage
litigation since all parties will know what the legal standard is.
Furthermore, the proposed rule will also save administrative costs by
discouraging multiparty litigation in failure to warn cases. The main
disadvantage of the proposed rule is that it may cut off some avenues
of recovery for injured parties. However, accident victims will not be
left without any remedy at all if there is a breach of duty; they will
simply be limited to a recovery against the party who actually failed to
provide the necessary safety information.
CONCLUSION
Producers and suppliers should be required to disclose safety
information about their products. Furthermore, this information must
reach product end users if it going to do any good. This information
may be conveyed directly to users or consumers or it may be transmit-
ted through warning chains. The latter approach is often both cheaper
and more effective than direct warnings and, therefore, should be
encouraged. The general rule proposed above is intended to achieve
this objective.
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